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The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as well as article I, sections 19 and 23 of the N.C. Constitution, guarantee a defendant certain personal rights during his or her trial. North Carolina statutes supplement these rights. This chapter covers six personal rights of an accused:
the right to be present at his or her trial,
the right to confront witnesses in the courtroom,
the right to choose whether to testify,
the right to allocution,
the right to appear for trial in civilian clothes, and
the right to appear for trial free of physical restraints.

The scope of this chapter is limited to the above. It does not cover the right to counsel or the right to self-representation, which are covered in JOHN RUBIN & ALYSON A. GRINE, 1 NORTH CAROLINA DEFENDER MANUAL Ch. 12 (Right to Counsel) (2d ed. 2013). Nor does it discuss the defendant’s rights to expert assistance, addressed in JOHN RUBIN & ALYSON A. GRINE, 1 NORTH CAROLINA DEFENDER MANUAL Ch. 5 (Experts and Other Assistance) (2d ed. 2013). This chapter also does not fully address a defendant’s confrontation rights during trial or the defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination. For a discussion of the constitutional implications of remote testimony—i.e., testimony given by a witness outside of the defendant’s physical presence by way of a “live,” closed-circuit television system—see infra § 29.8, Remote Testimony.

21.1 Right to Be Present

A. Basis of Right

Summary of law. A defendant’s right to presence depends on several sources of law, and the cases occasionally combine and confuse them. This brief summary offers the authors’ understanding of the basic legal principles.

Once the trial begins, a defendant has a right to be present at every stage of trial under the Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution and its counterpart under the N.C. Constitution. The right to presence applies not only to stages of the trial in which the defendant is actually confronting witnesses but also to stages at which testimony is not being offered, such as jury selection. Under the state constitution, a capital defendant’s right to presence at every stage of the trial cannot be waived.

Some matters that take place during trial may not be considered stages of the trial and so may not trigger a defendant’s right to presence under the federal and state confrontation clauses. A defendant still may have a due process right to presence, which applies whenever the defendant’s presence has a reasonably substantial relation to his or her opportunity to defend against the charges.

Before trial, a defendant’s right to presence depends primarily on due process. The courts have recognized a defendant’s right to presence at pretrial proceedings that implicate the defendant’s confrontation rights—that is, proceedings at which witnesses are giving testimony or other evidence is being presented—or when the defendant’s presence has a reasonably substantial relation to his or her opportunity to defend against the charges. The right is not absolute and depends on the particular proceedings at issue.
North Carolina statutes also may supplement the defendant’s constitutional rights by guaranteeing the defendant a right to presence at particular proceedings, such as jury views (discussed in subsection C., below).

When the courts have found no violation of the right to presence, they sometimes hold specifically that a defendant does not have a right to presence at the proceeding—for example, at grand jury proceedings before trial. Often, however, they base a finding of no violation, at least in part, on a form of waiver—that is, the failure of the defendant or counsel to request that the defendant be present during the proceeding. The courts also have engaged in harmless error analysis without specifically deciding whether the defendant had a right to presence and the trial judge erred. This analysis makes it difficult to say in some instances whether the defendant does or does not have a right to be present.

**Practice note:** If a proceeding or other matter begins without the defendant being present, and you believe that the defendant has a right to be present or that at least it is in the defendant’s interest to be present, you should specifically request the defendant’s presence in reliance on the constitutional and statutory authorities discussed below.

**Federal constitution.** The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees a defendant the right to personal presence at every stage of trial. *See Illinois v. Allen*, 397 U.S. 337 (1970); *see generally 6 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 24.2(a), at 363 (4th ed. 2015) (recognizing principle); Jeffrey B. Welty, North Carolina Capital Case Law Handbook 74 (UNC School of Government, 3d ed. 2013) (recognizing principle in capital cases). Some North Carolina cases have stated that the Sixth Amendment right to presence under the U.S. Constitution applies only to critical stages of trial, in contrast to the broader state constitutional right to presence, discussed next, at every stage of trial. *See State v. Huff*, 325 N.C. 1, 29 (1989) (citing *Rushen v. Spain*, 464 U.S. 114 (1983)), vacated on other grounds, 497 U.S. 1021 (1990); *State v. Buchanan*, 330 N.C. 202 (1991) (repeating statement from *Huff*). The statement of the federal standard in these North Carolina decisions appears to be incorrect. *See State v. Golphin*, 352 N.C. 364, 389 (2000) (relying on *Illinois v. Allen*, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), and recognizing the defendant’s right to be present at every stage of trial under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause). As a practical matter, however, federal cases may construe the federal right to presence more narrowly than North Carolina courts have interpreted the state constitutional right to presence. Application of the right to various proceedings is discussed further in the succeeding sections.

The Confrontation Clause also may give the defendant a right to presence at pretrial proceedings at which testimony or other evidence is presented. *See State v. Seaberry*, 97 N.C. App. 203, 210–11 (1990) (in addressing whether defendant had right to be present at hearing on pretrial motions, court states in reliance on *Illinois v. Allen*, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), that “[t]he Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment grants defendants the right to be present at any stage of the proceedings at which witnesses are to be questioned”). *But cf. Kentucky v. Stincer*, 482 U.S. 730, 740 (1987) (finding in child sex abuse case that defendant did not have a
constitutional right to presence at hearing to determine competency of child witnesses to testify). It is unclear what effect, if any, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in *Crawford v. Washington*, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), will have on a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to presence at pretrial proceedings in North Carolina. Courts from other jurisdictions have considered whether *Crawford* applies to pretrial proceedings and restricts the presentation of “testimonial” statements under the Sixth Amendment, and they have determined that it does not apply in that respect. See Jessica Smith, *Does Crawford Apply in Pretrial Proceedings?*, N.C. CRIM. L., UNC SCH. OF GOV’T BLOG (August 31, 2015).

The defendant also has a due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment to be present at a proceeding “whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.” *Snyder v. Massachusetts*, 291 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1934) (announcing test); see also *Kentucky v. Stincer*, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (“[A] defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.”). This due process right gives the defendant the right to presence at various pretrial proceedings as well as at trial proceedings at which the right to confrontation may not apply. The right includes “situations where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him.” *United States v. Gagnon*, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (per curiam).

**State constitution.** A defendant’s right to presence under the Confrontation Clause of the N.C. Constitution (N.C. CONST. art. I, § 23) is broader than the right to presence under the federal constitution in two respects. First, the North Carolina courts have held that the state constitutional right is broader than its federal counterpart in that it guarantees the defendant’s right to be present at *every* stage of his or her trial. See *State v. Badgett*, 361 N.C. 234 (2007); *State v. Haff*, 325 N.C. 1 (1989), vacated on other grounds, 497 U.S. 1021 (1990). While the U.S. Constitution also guarantees the right to presence at *every* stage of trial (in light of the cases discussed above), the state constitutional protection may be broader as applied to different trial proceedings (discussed in subsection C., below). The state right “extends to all times during the trial when anything is said or done which materially affects defendant as to the charge against him.” *State v. Chapman*, 342 N.C. 330, 337–38 (1995). Although the defendant’s right to presence is typically discussed in the context of proceedings inside the courtroom, the right to be present also can attach to proceedings outside the courtroom during the trial, such as if a judge communicates to jurors in the jury room or to counsel in the court’s chambers. See *State v. Hudson*, 331 N.C. 122 (1992) (recognizing this principle but finding that chance meeting between judge and juror in corridor might not constitute “stage” of trial and, if error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); *State v. Buchanan*, 330 N.C. 202 (1991) (providing wide range of examples of stages).

Second, the state constitution offers greater protection to capital defendants than the federal constitution because a capital defendant’s right to presence cannot be waived and the trial judge has the duty to ensure the defendant’s presence at trial. See infra § 21.1E, Express and Inferred Waivers of Right.
The North Carolina courts have stated that in general the right to presence under the state constitution’s confrontation clause does not guarantee the defendant’s presence before the trial commences. See, e.g., *State v. Golphin*, 352 N.C. 364, 389 (2000) (finding no violation of state constitutional right to presence at pretrial discussions with judge about possible venues for trial; defendants were present at later hearing at which their counsel stipulated to the venue change); cf. JEFFREY B. WELTY, NORTH CAROLINA CAPITAL CASE LAW HANDBOOK 75 (UNC School of Government, 3d ed. 2013) (noting cases in which capital defendants did not have the right to be present at the pretrial proceedings at issue, but observing that the N.C. appellate courts “have not comprehensively analyzed” the extent to which the right to presence applies at pretrial stages of a capital case.).

Additionally, because a defendant’s right to be present at every stage of trial also has a due process component, *State v. Seaberry*, 97 N.C. App. 203, 211 (1990) (citation omitted), article I, section 19 of the N.C. Constitution may also be applicable. See *State v. Tolley*, 290 N.C. 349, 364 (1976) (noting that the Law of the Land Clause of article I, section 19 of the N.C. Constitution is equivalent to the Due Process of Law Clause of the U.S. Constitution).

**Practice note:** Because the U.S. and N.C. Constitutions may provide different protections, be sure to ground any objection to a presence violation on both the federal and the state constitution.

### B. Pretrial Proceedings

Generally, the defendant’s right to be present at every stage of trial “does not arise prior to the commencement of trial.” *State v. Chapman*, 342 N.C. 330, 338 (1995) (determining that a conference that took place before the jury panel was selected and sworn was not “a stage of the trial” and the defendant’s right to be present at “every stage of his trial” was not implicated). However, if the subject matter of the hearing “implicates the defendant’s confrontation rights, or is such that the defendant’s presence would have a reasonably substantial relation to his opportunity to defend,” then he or she has the right to be present. See *State v. Buchanan*, 330 N.C. 202, 223–24 (1991); see also *Kentucky v. Stincer*, 482 U.S. 730, 740 (1987) (rather than attempting to characterize a hearing on the competency of child witnesses as a “trial” or “pretrial proceeding,” the Court found it to be “more useful to consider whether excluding the defendant from the hearing interfered[d] with his opportunity for effective cross-examination.”). For a further discussion of the applicable constitutional principles, see *supra* § 21.1A, Basis of Right.

**Evidentiary hearings.** Under the above principles, a defendant generally has the right to be present at hearings involving the examination of witnesses, such as suppression hearings, voir dire determinations, and other proceedings involving the presentation of evidence or determination of the admissibility of evidence at trial. See *State v. Seaberry*, 97 N.C. App. 203 (1990); see also *State v. Trapper*, 48 N.C. App. 481 (1980) (finding no prejudice from sequestration of defendants during testimony of witnesses during suppression hearing because their exclusion was for a short period of time and trial judge soon after reversed his sequestration order); *State v. Braswell*, 312 N.C. 553 (1985)
(recognizing defendant’s right to be present during mid-trial voir dire of witness, but finding that defendant waived right); *State v. Jones*, 89 N.C. App. 584 (1988) (recognizing defendant’s right to be present at proceeding to determine competency of child witness in sexual abuse case, but finding that defendant’s right was not violated because defendant could see and hear testimony via closed-circuit television and had adequate opportunity to communicate with his attorney). *But cf. Kentucky v. Stincer*, 482 U.S. 730, 740 (1987) (finding under U.S. Constitution that defendant could be excluded from voir dire hearing to determine competency of child witness in sexual abuse case even without an opportunity to see and hear proceedings). [For a further discussion of the use of closed-circuit television for certain witnesses, see infra § 29.4D, Child Witnesses (exclusion of defendant from competency hearing involving child witness) and § 29.8, Remote Testimony.]

**Non-evidentiary proceedings.** A number of cases have found no violation of the defendant’s right to presence during certain non-evidentiary pretrial proceedings or communications. Many of these cases involved housekeeping or administrative matters that did not implicate the defendant’s constitutional rights. In some that involved more substantive proceedings, the courts did not definitively resolve whether the defendant had a right to be present, finding no violation based, in part, on the defendant’s failure through counsel to request that the defendant be present or on the absence of prejudice to the defendant. The cases finding no presence violation include ones involving:

- A Rule 24 hearing on whether a case was to be tried capitally. *State v. Chapman*, 342 N.C. 330 (1995) (finding no violation of capital defendant’s unwaivable right to presence at trial because Rule 24 hearing is pretrial proceeding and not stage of trial). Notwithstanding *Chapman*, the defendant in a capital case is typically present at a Rule 24 hearing.
- A meeting between prosecutors, defense attorneys, and the judge to discuss possible change of venue sites or special venire locations where the defendants were present at a later hearing at which their counsel stipulated to the venue change. *State v. Golphin*, 352 N.C. 364 (2000).
- A pretrial conference on “housekeeping matters,” including the trial’s daily schedule, the basics of publicity, security in the courtroom, the jury selection procedure (which had previously been discussed), and the availability of a jury questionnaire, as well as a brief, nonbinding review of pending motions and a discussion of the possibility of a motion to continue. *State v. Buckner*, 342 N.C. 198 (1995).
- A hearing on a pretrial motion for discovery where defense counsel was present, consented to the defendant’s absence, and the defendant could show no resulting prejudice. *State v. Davis*, 290 N.C. 511 (1976).
- An announcement of a ruling in open court by the trial judge regarding a decision to partially release the defendant’s prison records to the State. *State v. Rich*, 346 N.C. 50, 56 (1997) (finding that “[a]lthough a better practice in this case may have been for the judge to have summoned defendant and defense counsel prior to announcing his final ruling,” there was no error and defendant’s presence would have served no purpose).
A routine communication between the judge and the prosecutor concerning scheduling matters. *State v. Locklear*, 349 N.C. 118 (1998) (defendant had no right to be present when prosecutor requested that the judge schedule an arraignment hearing).

A hearing with defense counsel present on motions for a special venire, consolidation of the cases, sequestration of witnesses, and change in venue where “at no time did counsel suggest the absence of defendants or note exceptions to their absence.” *State v. Richards*, 21 N.C. App. 686, 690 (1974).


**C. Trial Proceedings**

Stages of a trial at which a defendant has a constitutional right to presence include, of course, any part of the trial involving the testimony of witnesses or other presentation of evidence. See generally *Illinois v. Allen*, 397 U.S. 337 (1970); *Snyder v. Massachusetts*, 291 U.S. 97 (1934); *Diaz v. United States*, 223 U.S. 442 (1912). The defendant also has a right to presence, as described below, at other aspects of the trial.

**Jury selection.** Once the defendant’s case has been called for trial, the defendant’s right to be present during the process of selecting and impaneling the jury attaches. *Diaz v. United States*, 223 U.S. 442, 455 (1912). A judge therefore may not have private, unrecorded communications with a prospective juror to determine whether or not the juror may be excused. *State v. Smith*, 326 N.C. 792, 794 (1990) (“The process of selecting and impaneling the jury is a stage of the trial at which the defendant has a right to be present.”). Nor may a judge question jurors in the defendant’s absence even if defense counsel is present and the proceedings are recorded. *State v. Payne*, 328 N.C. 377 (1991).

The defendant’s right to be present during all stages of trial does not include the preliminary handling of jury venires before the defendant’s case has been called. *State v. Workman*, 344 N.C. 482, 498 (1996) (defendant “had no right to be present when prospective jurors were preliminarily sworn, oriented and qualified for jury service in general, without regard to any particular case or trial”); *see also State v. Williams*, 363 N.C. 689, 710 (2009) (random splitting of jury pool for “defendant’s proceeding and other matters being handled at the courthouse that day was a preliminary administrative matter at which defendant did not have a right to be present”).

Nor is a defendant’s right to presence violated by a judge’s private communications with prospective jurors if the defendant’s case has not yet been called for trial. *State v. Rannels*, 333 N.C. 644 (1993) (no error where trial judge held unrecorded side bar conferences with jurors before any case on calendar was called and before oath was administered to jury pool); *State v. Cole*, 331 N.C. 272 (1992) (no error where judge held
unrecorded bench conferences and excused prospective jurors before defendant’s case was called for trial, but it was error to do so after the defendant’s trial commenced).

**Jury view.** In an early U.S. Supreme Court decision, before many constitutional protections were made applicable to state criminal proceedings by incorporation through the Due Process Clause (such as the right of a defendant not to testify), the Court held that the Due Process Clause did not require the defendant’s presence at a jury view during trial unless a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his or her absence. See *Snyder v. Massachusetts*, 291 U.S. 97, 107–08 (1934). Assuming this principle remains valid under the U.S. Constitution, a defendant in North Carolina nevertheless has a statutory and a state constitutional right to be present at that proceeding. See G.S. 15A-1229(a); *State v. Harris*, 333 N.C. 543 (1993) (recognizing state constitutional right to presence during jury view, but finding that right was not violated by permitting jurors to roam independently through the alleged crime scene during the jury view while the defendant was present).

**In-chambers conferences with counsel.** A defendant has the right to presence at an in-chambers conference during trial. *State v. Buchanan*, 330 N.C. 202 (1991) (finding that to the extent that federal courts do not treat in-chambers conferences as a “stage” of trial, the defendant’s state constitutional right to presence is broader). It is error for a trial judge, during trial, to “conduct an in-chambers conference with the attorneys but without the defendant.” See *State v. Exum*, 343 N.C. 291, 295 (1996) (characterizing an in-chambers conference as a “critical stage” of trial). But cf. *State v. Daniels*, 337 N.C. 243 (1994) (judge’s telephone calls over the weekend to prosecutor and defense counsel after trial had commenced, in which trial judge merely informed them of the decision she had reached and heard no argument were not “such a stage” of the defendant’s trial as to require the defendant’s presence; judge announced ruling in open court the following day).

Although exclusion of the defendant is error, it will be found to be “harmless error” if nothing was done or said during the in-chambers conference that affects the defendant as to the charge against him or her “in any material respect.” See *State v. Brogden*, 329 N.C. 534, 541–42 (1991) (finding harmless error where an informal meeting was held in chambers with only the attorneys to discuss the jury instructions before the formal charge conference held in open court); see also *State v. Boyd*, 343 N.C. 699 (1996) (harmless error found where a recorded in-chambers conference was held with the attorneys, outside the presence of defendant, to discuss proposed mitigating circumstances; defense counsel was given the opportunity to preserve on the record every objection to the trial judge’s rulings and the reasons for their objections, and the substance of each of the defendant’s requested mitigating circumstances discussed during the conference was later submitted to the jury).

Where the right to presence is not waived or is not waivable (see infra § 21.1E, Express and Inferred Waivers of Right) and the subject matter of the in-chambers conference cannot be gleaned from the record, the State cannot meet its burden of showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant is entitled to a new trial.
See, e.g., State v. Meyer, 345 N.C. 619 (1997) (granting new capital sentencing hearing where trial judge held an in-chambers discussion with attorneys during jury selection, the substance of which was not summarized on the record in open court or otherwise gleanable from the record); State v. Exum, 343 N.C. 291 (capital defendant granted a new trial because the trial judge held a private in-chambers conference with the attorneys after a defense expert’s testimony and the substance of the private discussions was not revealed in the record).

**Bench conferences with counsel.** The North Carolina courts have held that bench conferences are a stage of trial and that the defendant’s state constitutional right to presence attaches; however, the defendant’s rights are not necessarily violated if the defendant is not at the bench itself.

Generally, a defendant’s constitutional right to be present is not violated “when, with defendant present in the courtroom, the trial court conducts bench conferences, even though unrecorded, with counsel for both parties.” See State v. Buchanan, 330 N.C. 202, 223 (1991). Holding a bench conference without the defendant present is permissible if the subject of the bench conference is a point of law, a procedural matter, or an administrative matter, and the conference does not involve communication with the jury or testimony by a witness concerning the defendant’s guilt. See State v. Robinson, 330 N.C. 1 (1991). “If, however, the subject matter of the conference implicates the defendant’s confrontation rights, or is such that the defendant’s presence would have a reasonably substantial relation to his opportunity to defend, the defendant would have a constitutional right to be present” at the bench conference itself. Buchanan, 330 N.C. 202, 223–24. The defendant bears the burden of showing the “usefulness” of his or her presence to prove a violation of the right to presence. “Once a violation of the right is apparent, the burden shifts to the State to show that it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 224.

Although the defendant was not actually present at the bench with the attorneys in Buchanan, the N.C. Supreme Court reasoned that there was no constitutional violation of the right to presence since the defendant was personally present in the courtroom. By holding a bench conference with counsel for both sides, the trial judge did not “negate” the defendant’s actual presence at all stages of the trial. See Buchanan, 330 N.C. 202, 223. According to the court, the defendant was able to observe the context of the conference and obtain first-hand knowledge of what transpired through his attorneys. Defense counsel was free to raise for the record any matters to which the defendant took exception. The court also found it relevant that conferences typically deal with nonprejudicial administrative matters or “legal matters with which an accused is likely unfamiliar and incapable of rendering meaningful assistance.” Id.

Federal courts have generally interpreted the federal right to presence at bench conferences more narrowly than the state right is interpreted by North Carolina courts. Some federal cases, discussed in Buchanan, have found no right to presence on the ground that a bench conference is not a “stage” of the trial, but North Carolina courts have rejected that rationale in favor of the above approach.
**Practice note:** If the judge conducts a bench conference without the defendant present, and you believe that it implicates the defendant’s confrontation rights or that the defendant’s presence would have a reasonably substantial relation to his or her opportunity to defend against the charges, you should immediately object to the defendant’s absence from the conference on state and federal constitutional grounds and assert for the record the reasons that the defendant’s presence would be useful. Even in situations in which you do not object because you do not believe that the defendant’s presence would be useful, you should ask afterward that the subject matter of the bench conference be placed on the record to ensure a complete record for appellate purposes.

**Voir dire of witnesses.** A defendant has the right to be present during a voir dire to determine the admissibility of evidence. See supra § 21.1B, Pretrial Proceedings (discussing right to presence at evidentiary hearings). However, this right may not be absolute in voir dire hearings to determine the competency of a child witness. See infra § 29.4D, Child Witnesses (discussing constitutional implications of exclusion of defendant from voir dire examination of a child during competency hearing).

**Summation.** A defendant has the right to be present during closing arguments. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934) (assuming that defendants have a right under the Due Process Clause to be present at the “summing up of counsel, for it will be in his power, if present, to give advice or suggestion or even to supersede his lawyers altogether and conduct the trial himself”); see also Larson v. Tansy, 911 F.2d 392, 396 (10th Cir. 1990) (concluding that the defendant had a due process right to be present at the giving of jury instructions, closing statements, and rendering of the verdict; the denial of this right was not harmless error because there was “a reasonable possibility of prejudice to defendant in that his absence precluded him from providing any assistance to his attorney and from exerting any psychological influence on the jury”); State v. Okumura, 570 P.2d 848, 853 (Haw. 1977) (State failed to meet its burden of showing that defendant’s absence from jury instructions, closing argument, and rendition of the verdict was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; presence of defense counsel could not render error harmless per se because “‘the presence of counsel is no substitute for the presence of the defendant himself’” (citation omitted)).

**Charge conference.** A defendant has a right to be present during the charge conference. See State v. Brogden, 329 N.C. 534 (1991) (error for judge to hold informal meeting to discuss jury instructions in chambers out of defendant’s presence, but harmless because a formal charge conference was then held in open court where entire matter was entered into the record and counsel made legal arguments and took exceptions); State v. Wise, 326 N.C. 421 (1990) (holding that error, if any, in excluding defendant from the unrecorded charge conference was harmless where the trial judge subsequently announced the proposed instructions on the record and gave counsel an opportunity to be heard).

**Judge instructions to or communications with jury.** Once the defendant’s case has been called for trial, the trial judge may not privately communicate with any member of the jury in the absence of the defendant. See State v. Payne, 320 N.C. 138 (1987) (right to
presence violated where judge gave admonishments to the jury in the jury room); *State v. Buckom*, 100 N.C. App. 179 (1990) (reversible error occurred where judge engaged in ex parte communication with jury in jury room before the verdict and record did not disclose the content of the discussion); cf. *State v. Wilson*, 363 N.C. 478 (2009) (trial judge violated defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict under N.C. Constitution article I, section 24 by holding unrecorded bench conferences with jury foreperson in which he gave instructions to that juror and not others; judge also told juror not to discuss those issues with the other jurors when he returned to the jury room); *State v. Ashe*, 314 N.C. 28, 36 (1985) (it is a violation of a defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict under N.C. Constitution article I, section 24 for a judge to communicate instructions privately to “a jury foreman, another individual juror, or anyone else” regarding matters material to the case and then have that person relay the instructions to the full jury because all twelve jurors must be instructed consistently). Moreover, it is a violation of the defendant’s state constitutional right to presence for the trial judge to fail to disclose that the jury has sent a note to him or her even if the judge does not communicate with the jury regarding the note. See *State v. Mackey*, 241 N.C. App. 586 (2015).

**Bailiff communications with jury.** Cases have held that where the bailiff enters the jury room to give clerical instructions, such as permitting the jury to take a break, there is not a presence violation. See, e.g., *State v. Gay*, 334 N.C. 467, 483 (1993) (finding no reversible error but acknowledging that trial judge’s procedure in having the bailiff instruct the jury regarding breaks and reminding them to follow the judge’s earlier instructions “may run the risk of violating defendant’s right to be present”); *State v. May*, 334 N.C. 609 (1993) (no constitutional violation where judge instructed the bailiff to tell the jury to take a fifteen minute break); *State v. Coleman*, 161 N.C. App. 224 (2003) (no constitutional violation where trial judge had bailiff admonish a juror, outside the presence of the defendant, not to discuss the case with anyone).

**Clerk communications with jury.** There is not a presence violation when the court clerk, outside the presence of the defendant, speaks with the jury about administrative matters if the matters discussed are not substantive, they do not relate to the consideration of the defendant’s guilt or innocence, and the defendant cannot show that his or her presence would have a reasonably substantial relation to his or her opportunity to defend. See, e.g., *State v. Golphin*, 352 N.C. 364 (2000) (no constitutional violation where judge had clerk perform administrative duties outside defendant’s presence, including providing logistical information to newly selected jurors); *State v. Bacon*, 337 N.C. 66 (1994) (no constitutional violation where trial judge had clerk, outside defendant’s presence, perform the administrative duties of calling the jury roll and explaining to the jurors what time they needed to arrive at court).

**Verdict.** A defendant has the right to be present at the return of the verdict. *Diaz v. United States*, 223 U.S. 442, 455 (1912) (recognizing right); *State v. Harris*, 27 N.C. App. 15, 20 (1975) (holding that although the noncapital defendant had a right to be present at the rendition of the verdict, he waived this right where there was nothing in the record “to indicate that the absence of defendant and his counsel was other than voluntary”); see also *State v. Webster*, 111 N.C. App. 72 (1993) (any error in the acceptance of the verdict
against defendant in her absence was harmless because the judge had already explained to the jury that defendant was absent for good cause shown, defense counsel was present, and defendant’s presence at that stage of the proceedings could not have made a difference to the outcome of the trial), aff’d, 337 N.C. 674 (1994).

Sentencing. A defendant has the right to be present “‘when evidence is introduced for the purpose of determining the amount of punishment to be imposed’” or when sentence is actually imposed. State v. Davis, 186 N.C. App. 242, 249 (2007) (quoting State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326, 330 (1962)); see generally G.S. 15A-1334 (setting out the requirements for a noncapital sentencing hearing). The right to presence at sentencing appears to apply to all felony and misdemeanor cases where a “corporal” sentence is imposed—i.e., one that includes a sentence of imprisonment, active or suspended. See State v. Cherry, 154 N.C. 624 (1911) (setting aside judgments sentencing defendants in absentia “to a term of twelve months on the roads” and remanding case for new sentencing hearing); see also State v. Brooks, 211 N.C. 702 (1937) (following Cherry). No right-to-presence violation appears to occur if the defendant is sentenced in absentia as long as he or she does not receive a sentence of imprisonment. See State v. Ferebee, 266 N.C. 606 (1966) (finding no error where judge pronounced judgment in defendant’s absence imposing a fine and costs; no active or suspended sentence of imprisonment was imposed).

The right of a defendant to be present at the time “sentence or judgment is pronounced is a common law right, separate and apart from the constitutional or statutory right to be present at the trial.” Pope, 257 N.C. 326, 330 (citing Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118, 129 (1891) (“At common law no judgment for corporal punishment could be pronounced against a man in his absence . . . .”). The principles behind this undeniable right to be personally present when sentence is imposed are that a defendant should be given a full opportunity to (1) rebut or explain all information coming to the notice of the court that tends to defame and condemn the defendant and aggravate punishment; (2) to give his or her version of the charged offense; and (3) to introduce any relevant mitigating facts. Pope, 257 N.C. 326, 334-35; see also State v. Midyette, 87 N.C. App. 199 (1987) (cautioning against in camera hearings such as the recorded one held here with attorneys and rape victim, but without defendant, to permit the victim to express her views about appropriate punishment and without an opportunity for defendant to rebut the information received by the court), aff’ed per curiam, 322 N.C. 108 (1988).

Although the appellate courts of North Carolina have never specifically addressed whether a defendant has a constitutional right to be present at sentencing, some federal circuit courts have adopted the general view that a criminal defendant, in addition to having a right to presence at sentencing under Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a)(3), also enjoys a federal constitutional right to be present at sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Santiago, 769 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2014); United States v. Williams, 641 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. DeMott, 513 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Bigelow, 462 F.3d 378 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Agostino, 132 F.3d 1183 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Townsend, 33 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Jackson, 923 F.2d 1494 (11th Cir. 1991). The source of a federal constitutional right to presence at sentencing is grounded in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and in the

Sometimes a written judgment will differ from what was imposed orally by the trial judge in open court at the sentencing hearing. The announcement of a judgment in open court merely constitutes the “rendering” of judgment, not the “entry.” It is the written judgment entered by the trial judge that constitutes the actual sentence imposed on a defendant. If the written judgment contains a “substantive change” from the sentence rendered in open court at the sentencing hearing, the defendant has the right to be present to give him or her an opportunity to be heard. See State v. Crumbley, 135 N.C. App. 59 (1999) (sentence vacated and the matter remanded for the entry of a new sentencing judgment where trial judge, in defendant’s absence, substantively altered the original sentence when entering the written judgment to make the sentences run consecutively instead of concurrently); see also State v. Leaks, 240 N.C. App. 573 (2015) (substantive change found where the written judgment reflected a longer maximum sentence than that rendered in defendant’s presence in open court); State v. Dubose, 208 N.C. App. 406 (2010) (although the sentence of imprisonment was not altered in written judgment, trial judge erroneously added a finding outside defendant’s presence that defendant had engaged in street gang activity); State v. Mims, 180 N.C. App. 403 (2006) (written judgment erroneously included nine months of intensive probation that was not reflected in the transcript of the proceedings held in defendant’s presence in open court). However, if the change is a “non-discretionary byproduct of the sentence that was imposed in defendant’s presence in open court, it does not constitute a substantive change and vacation of the sentence imposed is not required. See, e.g., State v. Harp, 244 N.C. App. 153 (2015) (unpublished) (imposition of jail fees in written judgment did not constitute a substantive change in defendant’s sentence that would require his presence); State v. Divinie, 229 N.C. App. 197 (2013) (unpublished) (imposition of mandatory $100,000 fine in written judgment for trafficking did not require defendant’s presence); State v. Arrington, 215 N.C. App. 161 (2011) (addition of court costs and community service fees in written judgment did not constitute a substantive change or infringe on defendant’s right to presence).

The right to presence at sentencing, like the right to presence at trial and verdict, may be waived under certain conditions. See infra § 21.1E, Express and Inferred Waivers of Right (discussing requirements for express waivers and waivers inferred from a defendant’s voluntary absence at sentencing); see also infra § 23.4I, Guilty Pleas through Counsel (discussing ability of defendants, through counsel, to plead guilty to relatively minor offenses without making a personal appearance).

Juvenile Proceedings. Juveniles have a state constitutional right to presence in delinquency hearings similar to that afforded to adult criminal defendants. In re Lineberry, 154 N.C. App. 246 (2002) (error, but harmless, for judge to hold an in-chambers discussion with defense counsel and prosecutor involving a conference call with the doctor who performed the court-ordered evaluation).
D. Post-Conviction Proceedings

The courts have found no constitutional right to presence on a motion for a new trial or similar motion. See State v. Dry, 152 N.C. 813 (1910) (so stating generally); see also Barber v. United States, 142 F.2d 805, 806 (4th Cir. 1944) (petitioner had no federal constitutional right to be present at a hearing of his motion for a new trial, filed six years after conviction, because “[s]uch a hearing is in no sense a part of the criminal trial at which the Constitution requires the presence of the accused”). A defendant has a statutory right under G.S. 15A-1420(c) to be present at an evidentiary hearing on a motion for appropriate relief (and perhaps a due process and confrontation right because of the nature of the proceeding). However, if no evidentiary hearing is held and the judge is determining only questions of law, the defendant does not have a right to be present. See G.S. 15A-1420(c)(3).

The courts also have found no right to presence on appeal of asserted legal errors in the trial. See State v. Jacobs, 107 N.C. 772 (1890); State v. Overton, 77 N.C. 485 (1877); see also Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U.S. 442, 449 (1892) (neither reason nor public policy require that a defendant be personally present pending proceedings in an appellate court, especially where he or she has counsel to represent him in the court of review).

E. Express and Inferred Waivers of Right

This discussion concerns the waiver of presence at trial following a not guilty plea. A defendant may enter a guilty plea, without being present, to relatively minor offenses, such as traffic offenses or misdemeanors for which the judge has accepted a written waiver of appearance. For a discussion of a defendant’s entry of a guilty plea through counsel, see infra § 23.4I, Guilty Pleas through Counsel.

Capital cases. Under the N.C. Constitution, a capital defendant’s right to presence cannot be waived and the trial judge has the duty to insure his or her presence at trial. State v. Badgett, 361 N.C. 234 (2007). A capital defendant need not object—and can even consent to being absent—without waiving appellate review of the issue of a violation of the right to presence. State v. Williams, 363 N.C. 689 (2009).

A defendant’s presence at trial for a capital felony “is a matter of public as well as private concern. Public policy requires his attendance at such a trial.” State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198, 209 (1969) (citation omitted); see also State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1 (1989) (error, but harmless, for trial judge to honor distraught capital defendant’s request to allow the trial to proceed in his absence), vacated on other grounds, 497 U.S. 1021 (1990); State v. Ferebee, 266 N.C. 606, 609 (1966) (citing State v. Kelly, 97 N.C. 404, 405 (1887)) (holding that not only does a capital defendant have “a right to be present; he must be present”); compare infra § 21.1F, Removal of Disruptive Defendant (discussing the removal of a disruptive defendant from the courtroom).

Noncapital cases. A noncapital defendant’s right to be present at trial and related proceedings is a purely personal right and can be waived either expressly or by the failure
to timely assert it. *State v. Richardson*, 330 N.C. 174 (1991); *State v. Braswell*, 312 N.C. 553 (1985). In noncapital felony cases, only the defendant may waive the right. In misdemeanor cases, the defendant may waive his or her right through counsel with the consent of the court. *State v. Shackleford*, 59 N.C. App. 357 (1982). *But see State v. Piland*, 58 N.C. App. 95 (1982) (holding that the defense attorney representing the defendant in a noncapital felony case had the power to waive defendant’s presence at a pretrial suppression hearing).

While it is the better practice for the trial judge to obtain an explicit waiver from the defendant before conducting any “important proceeding” in his or her absence, it is not necessarily error to fail to do so. *Braswell*, 312 N.C. 553, 559. Waiver of the right to presence may occur by the failure to assert it. *Id.; State v. Christian*, 150 N.C. App. 77, 81 (2002) (finding that the failure of defendant and his counsel to object to the removal of defendant from the courtroom during the judge’s questioning of a juror who asked to be dismissed from the jury, followed by defense counsel’s request to have that juror removed and replaced, amounted to a waiver of defendant’s right to be present); see also infra “Waiver by failure to assert the right” in this subsection E.

**Express waiver.** A defendant charged with a misdemeanor or a noncapital felony may expressly waive the right to be present for the trial of his or her case by following the procedure set out in G.S. 15A-1011(d). Under this statute, if a defendant seeks to waive this right, he or she must execute a written waiver of appearance, plead not guilty, and designate legal counsel to appear on his or her behalf. The defendant also must agree in writing to

- waive the right to testify in person;
- waive the right to face his or her accusers in person; and
- be bound by the decision of the court and entry of judgment (subject to the right of appeal).

G.S. 15A-1011(d)(1).

The defendant also must submit the following in writing:

- an enumeration of circumstances justifying the request; and
- a request to proceed under this section.

G.S. 15A-1011(d)(2). The judge may allow the defendant to be absent from his or her trial “because of distance, infirmity or other good cause.” G.S. 15A-1011(d)(3). *Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b)(2) (allowing the court, in its discretion and with defendant’s written consent, to conduct proceedings in misdemeanor cases in defendant’s absence).*

If the defendant’s request to waive presence is granted, the trial will proceed as if he or she were actually present. The State will present its case, and the defense will be given the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against the defendant and to present its case if desired. *See G.S. 15A-1011(e).*
It is not an abuse of discretion for a trial judge to deny a defendant’s motion to be allowed to waive his or her presence at trial if the defendant does not comply with the above procedures. See State v. Forrest, 168 N.C. App. 614 (2005) (no abuse of discretion by trial judge in denying defendant’s oral motion to waive his right to appear at trial made after the judge ordered defendant to appear at trial strapped to a chair, handcuffed, and masked from the eyes down). But see State v. Whitted, 209 N.C. App. 522 (2011) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the trial judge violated G.S. 15A-1011 by accepting defense counsel’s oral waiver of the defendant’s right to be present for certain parts of the trial after the trial had commenced; according to the court of appeals, G.S. 15A-1011 applies only when the defendant wants to waive the right to be present for entry of plea, not when the defendant wants to waive the right to be present at other parts of trial; the court of appeals went on to hold that the defendant waived her right to be present by refusing to leave her jail cell and return to the courtroom after the trial had commenced). [The limitation of G.S. 15A-1011 to the entry of plea by Whitted and its progeny appears to be inconsistent with the express provisions of the statute and other opinions interpreting it; that portion of the opinion was unnecessary to the ultimate holding in Whitted, which is consistent with the line of cases finding a waiver of the right to presence based on the defendant’s voluntary absence after the trial commences, discussed below.]

**No absolute “right to absence” at trial.** The N.C. Court of Appeals has held that there is no absolute “right to absence”—i.e., there is no absolute right to waive one’s presence at trial. See State v. Shaw, 218 N.C. App. 607 (2012); see also Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34–35 (1965) (“[t]he ability to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist upon the opposite of that right”). The Shaw court found that the N.C. Supreme Court, in State v. Kelly, 97 N.C. 404 (1887), had “contemplated a trial court’s power to require a defendant’s presence at his trial, even despite that defendant’s attempted absence.” Shaw, 218 N.C. App. 607, 609. The Shaw court rejected the defendant’s argument that G.S. 15A-1011(d) provided support for his contention that he had an absolute right to waive his presence at trial. Citing State v. Whitted, 209 N.C. App. 522 (2011), the court stated that G.S. 15A-1011(d) applies only to a defendant’s waiver of the right to be present for the entry of pleas and not to waivers of presence at trial. [As discussed under Express waiver, above, the Whitted opinion’s limitation of G.S. 15A-1011 to the entry of pleas appears to be inconsistent with the statute and other opinions interpreting it; that portion of the opinion was unnecessary to the ultimate holding in Whitted.]

**Practice note:** Proceeding to trial without the defendant’s presence is ordinarily not desirable since he or she will be unable to participate or assist in the defense. If the defendant indicates a desire to waive this right, you should strongly advise him or her not to do so except in extraordinary circumstances.

**Voluntarily absent defendant at trial stage.** In a noncapital case, a defendant’s voluntary and unexplained absence from court after his or her trial begins constitutes a waiver of the right to be present. State v. Richardson, 330 N.C. 174 (1991); State v. Davis, 186 N.C. App. 242 (2007); State v. Mulwee, 27 N.C. App. 366 (1975); see also State v.
Montgomery, 33 N.C. App. 693, 695 (1977) (once a trial for a noncapital felony has begun in defendant’s presence, he or she waives the right to presence and the trial can be validly completed in his or her absence if the defendant is on bail and is voluntarily absent or if he or she escapes from custody and flees). To hold otherwise would allow a defendant who is out on bond “‘to break up a trial already commenced’” and “‘to prevent any trial whatever until the accused person himself should be pleased to permit it.’” Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 457 (1912) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Taylor, 414 U.S. 17 (1973) (defendant’s voluntary absence from trial after lunch recess of first day of trial amounted to a waiver of the right to be present and continuation of trial in his absence was proper under Fed. R. Crim. P. 43).

Once trial has commenced, the defendant has the burden of explaining his or her absence to the satisfaction of the trial judge. State v. Stockton, 13 N.C. App. 287 (1971) (finding waiver where defendant voluntarily absented himself after the first day of trial and noting that defense counsel did not offer any explanation for defendant’s absence). If this burden is not met, a waiver of the right to be present is inferable. Richardson, 330 N.C. 174 (defendant failed to meet burden of explaining his absence where explanation was uncorroborated, untimely, and initially offered by an unidentified friend of the defendant).

Where a defendant’s absence is attributable to a lack of notice, his or her absence does not operate as a waiver. See State v. Hayes, 291 N.C. 293 (1976) (defendant did not waive his right to appear where defendant and counsel had been instructed by district attorney that they would receive one-half day’s notice before the case would be called but received only two hours’ notice).

While there are no North Carolina cases that deal specifically with commencing a trial in a defendant’s absence, the implication from the above cases is that a defendant cannot be tried in absentia where the defendant was not present when the trial began unless he or she had expressly waived the right to presence. See also Richardson, 330 N.C. 174, 179 (after noting that “it is clear that trial had begun before defendant absented himself,” court of appeals found no error in trial judge’s denial of continuance where defendant voluntarily absented himself after jury selection but before the jury was empaneled); State v. Kelly, 97 N.C. 404, 408 (1887) (noting that when a prisoner is not in custody but is “under recognizance for his appearance, the court will not begin a trial in his absence, unless he expressly waives his right to be present. . . .”). The implicit rationale of the cases finding waiver after trial has commenced is that a defendant who is present when trial commences has due notice of the time that the trial is to recommence and, by absenting himself or herself, voluntarily waives the right to presence. See, e.g., Davis, 186 N.C. App. 242; Stockton, 13 N.C. App. 287; cf. Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 261–62 (1993) (holding that Fed. R. Crim. P. 43 “prohibits the trial in absentia of a defendant who is not present at the beginning of trial” and noting that there is a difference between flight before and flight during a trial because a defendant’s initial presence at trial “serves to assure that any waiver is indeed knowing”).
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Forfeiture of right to presence by voluntary intoxication or impairment. A defendant charged with a misdemeanor or noncapital felony who voluntarily becomes intoxicated or impaired after trial has begun may be found to have waived his or her right to presence. See State v. Minyard, 231 N.C. App. 605 (2014). In Minyard, the defendant ingested a large quantity of sedative, hypnotic, or anxiolytic medications and alcohol during jury deliberations and became lethargic, stuporous, and non-responsive. He was taken into custody and examined by emergency medical services. Deliberations continued and the verdict was returned in his absence. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial judge erred in failing to conduct a competency hearing sua sponte. Although there was “ample evidence to raise a bona fide doubt” whether the defendant was competent to stand trial, the N.C. Court of Appeals found that the more appropriate analysis was whether the defendant had waived his right to be present during the proceedings. Id. at 626. The court likened the defendant’s actions in ingesting the substances to those of defendants who are removed from the courtroom due to disruptive behavior or who choose to voluntarily absent themselves from trial. The court then held that the defendant waived his right to be present by his voluntary actions in ingesting the intoxicants. “To hold otherwise would create a rule where ‘many persons, by their own acts, could effectively prevent themselves from ever being tried.’” Id. at 627 (citing People v. Rogers, 309 P.2d 949 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (defendant impliedly waived his right to be mentally present when he apparently injected himself with a large dose of insulin to induce insulin shock and avoid continuing with his trial)).

Practice note: If the defendant explicitly or implicitly waives his or her right to be present at trial, counsel should object to any prejudicial testimony presented about the absence or to any prejudicial references to the defendant’s absence made by the prosecutor during closing argument or the issue will not be fully preserved for appellate review. See State v. Britt, ___ N.C. App. ___, 791 S.E.2d 666 (2016) (unpublished) (holding that even if the prosecutor improperly commented on defendant’s absence from trial, the comments were not so grossly improper that the trial judge would have been compelled to strike the argument sua sponte); State v. Wallace, ___ N.C. App. ___, 787 S.E.2d 464 (2016) (unpublished) (where defendant voluntarily absented himself after the first day of trial, testimony by police officer that he had not seen defendant since that day and did not know defendant’s whereabouts was irrelevant but did not amount to plain error).

Counsel should also consider whether it would be helpful for the jury to be instructed that the defendant has waived his or her right to be present and that the defendant’s absence should not be considered with regard to his or her guilt or innocence. See, e.g., State v. Webster, 111 N.C. App. 72 (1993) (judge informed jury that the defendant had been excused from the day’s proceedings for good cause), aff’d, 337 N.C. 674 (1994). If no instruction is requested, the failure of the judge to instruct on this subordinate feature of the case will not be held to be error. See State v. Turner, 11 N.C. App. 670 (1971) (so holding). The pattern jury instructions do not contain an instruction on this issue. If an instruction on the defendant’s absence is desired, counsel should draft one that fits the facts of the case and request that it be submitted to the jury. Do not leave it up to the judge or prosecutor to draft the instruction. See, e.g., State v. McNeil, 209 N.C. App. 654,
666–67 (2011) (judge “merely explained defendant’s absence for the record” and did not err in instructing the jury that “[t]he defendant, for whatever reason and only known to him, has refused to return after the lunch recess. We have given him ample opportunity to show up. He has failed to do so.”).

Sample instruction: Below is a sample instruction on a defendant’s absence from trial.

You may have noticed that Mr./Ms. _____ was not present during [part of] the trial of this case. A defendant charged with a noncapital felony may waive his or her constitutional right to be present for trial. Mr./Ms. _____’s absence may not be considered as evidence against him/her and you may not draw any inferences of guilt whatsoever from his/her absence. You must render a fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence that was presented at trial in open court and the fact that Mr./Ms. _____ was not present may not be considered by you in any way in arriving at that verdict.

Voluntarily absent defendant at sentencing. The N.C. appellate courts have long held that the defendant’s presence, if voluntarily waived, is not necessary to a valid trial and conviction, but his or her presence at sentencing is essential if the sentence “involves and includes corporal punishment.” See, e.g., State v. Cherry, 154 N.C. 624, 627 (1911) (setting aside judgments sentencing defendants “to a term of twelve months on the roads” and remanding case for new sentencing hearing where defendants had voluntarily absented themselves from trial and sentencing after the first day); State v. Brooks, 211 N.C. 702, 704 (1937) (striking judgment entered against defendant in his absence that assigned defendant to two years on the roads; the “presence of the accused is essential” when corporal punishment is imposed); State v. Stockton, 13 N.C. App. 287, 292 (1971) (holding that even though defendant waived his right to be present during trial and at rendition of the verdict by voluntarily absenting himself from trial after the first day, the trial judge erred in sentencing defendant in absentia to a sentence of imprisonment because “when a sentence involving corporal punishment is imposed upon a verdict, either on a capital felony charge, a felony charge less than capital, or a misdemeanor, the defendant must be present”); see also supra § 21.1C, Trial Proceedings (discussing right to presence at sentencing).

Contrary to these decisions, however, North Carolina may no longer recognize an unwaivable right to be present at sentencing when corporal punishment is imposed. In State v. Miller, 142 N.C. App. 435 (2001), the N.C. Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s argument that the trial judge erred in conducting a sentencing hearing after the defendant had fled the courthouse during jury deliberations. In reaching its decision, the court relied on G.S. 15A-1334(a), which provides that a trial judge must hold a sentencing hearing “[u]nless the defendant waives the hearing.” According to that statute, a trial judge may continue the hearing on a showing of “good cause.” The Miller court held that the “defendant’s flight and refusal to participate in the proceedings despite being a convicted felon did not constitute “good cause” to continue the hearing; therefore, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in failing to continue the hearing until such time as the defendant could be located. Id. at 446.
Likewise, in *State v. Skipper*, 146 N.C. App. 532 (2001), the N.C. Court of Appeals found no error by the trial judge in going forward with the defendant’s habitual felon proceeding after the defendant failed to return from a recess. The defendant’s absence was unexplained so the trial judge was “correct to infer that defendant waived his right to be present for the remainder of the proceeding,” which included the taking of the verdict and sentencing the defendant to an active term of imprisonment of a minimum of 116 months and a maximum of 149 months. *Id.* at 536 (citing *Miller*); see also *State v. Moore*, 238 N.C. App. 364 (2014) (unpublished) (citing *Miller* and finding under the circumstances of that case that defendant waived her right to be present when active sentence in presumptive range was imposed after she voluntarily absented herself during trial and did not return; court held that by enacting G.S. 15A-1334(a) [in 1977], the General Assembly acknowledged that a right to presence at sentencing may be waived by the defendant and that the same reasoning that applies to voluntary absences during trial should apply to sentencing).

G.S. 15A-1011(d), discussed above under “Express waiver,” allows a defendant to plead not guilty and waive the right to be present at trial in misdemeanor and noncapital felony cases in certain circumstances. This statute may override cases decided before the statute’s enactment indicating that the defendant must be present if the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment; however, the statute requires an express waiver of the right to be present and does not provide support for the above decisions finding a waiver based on the defendant’s failure to appear. Instead of sentencing in absentia a defendant who has not expressly waived the right to presence, the trial judge should enter a prayer for judgment continued until such time as the defendant can be brought to court. See Jessica Smith, *Trial in the Defendant’s Absence*, N.C. SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK (June 2009).

**Practice note:** Proceeding with sentencing in the defendant’s absence is not desirable since he or she will be unable to assist or participate. Unless the defendant has expressly waived the right to presence as permitted by G.S. 15A-1011(d), counsel should move to continue the sentencing hearing if the defendant is not present. If possible, offer an explanation for the defendant’s absence and introduce any evidence or testimony that corroborates the explanation. If the motion is denied, counsel should object to the imposition of any sentence of imprisonment, active or suspended, and cite to the defendant’s common law right to presence at sentencing. Although neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the N.C. Supreme Court have specifically ruled on whether a defendant has a constitutional right to presence at sentencing, you should cite to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and to article I, sections 19 and 23 of the N.C. Constitution. See supra § 21.1C, Trial Proceedings (discussing right to presence at sentencing and noting that some federal circuit courts have adopted the general view that a criminal defendant, in addition to having a right to presence at sentencing under the federal rules of criminal procedure, also has a federal constitutional right to be present at sentencing).

The decision in *State v. Miller*, 142 N.C. App. 435 (2001), discussed above, dealt only with the defendant’s waiver of the sentencing hearing and whether good cause for a
continuance had been shown under G.S. 15A-1334. The court did not directly address, nor was it asked to address, the trial judge’s imposition of an active sentence in the defendant’s absence in violation of the long-standing common law prohibition against such an action or in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights. The later decision in \textit{State v. Skipper}, 146 N.C. App. 532 (2001), holding that the defendant waived the right to presence at sentencing by his unexplained absence is contrary to controlling precedent by the N.C. Supreme Court in \textit{State v. Cherry}, 154 N.C. 624 (1911), and \textit{State v. Brooks}, 211 N.C. 702 (1937). See also \textit{Dunn v. Pate}, 334 N.C. 115 (1993) (holding that Court of Appeals has no authority to overrule decisions of N.C. Supreme Court and must follow them until otherwise ordered to do so). Additionally, the previously discussed unpublished decision in \textit{State v. Moore}, 238 N.C. App. 364 (2014), does not constitute controlling legal authority. See N.C. R. App. P. 30(e)(3).

\textbf{Waiver by failure to assert the right.} In a noncapital case, a defendant’s failure to assert his or her right to presence at certain proceedings may be treated as a waiver. For example, if a judge calls a juror to the bench, or conducts an in-chambers conference that the defendant knows about but does not ask to attend, the right to presence may be deemed waived. See, e.g., \textit{State v. Watson}, 338 N.C. 168 (1994) (by failing to object to judge’s directive to bailiff to instruct the jury to reduce its question to writing and then retrieve it, defendant waived his right to presence and could not assign as error the judge’s alleged denial of the right); \textit{State v. Pittman}, 332 N.C. 244 (1992) (finding waiver where defendant failed to request to be present at or object to his absence from bench and in-chambers conferences held by the judge with the attorneys); \textit{State v. Braswell}, 312 N.C. 553 (1985) (defendant waived right to be present at a voir dire hearing on the admissibility of evidence where he knew or should have known about the hearing and failed to assert his right to attend).

\section*{F. Removal of Disruptive Defendant}
Notwithstanding the constitutional right to presence at trial, a noncapital defendant may “waive” this right and be removed from the courtroom if he or she becomes so disruptive that the trial cannot proceed in an orderly fashion. See \textit{State v. Brown}, 19 N.C. App. 480 (1973); see also \textit{Illinois v. Allen}, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970) (in order to maintain a proper courtroom atmosphere when the defendant is acting disruptively, the trial judge may constitutionally “(1) bind and gag him, thereby keeping him present; (2) cite him for contempt; [or] (3) take him out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly”).

\textbf{Practice note:} Removal of the defendant is a drastic measure because it undermines the defendant’s rights to effective assistance of counsel and to confront the witnesses and evidence against him or her. Counsel should ask for a recess first to give the client an opportunity to collect himself or herself. If the judge opts for physical restraints of a disruptive defendant instead of removal, the restraints should be unobtrusive and not viewable by the jury. See generally \textit{State v. Woodard}, 102 N.C. App. 687 (1991) (trial judge did not err by refusing to remove the defendant where the defendant ceased to be disruptive once shackled). For a discussion of the use of physical restraints and potential
interference with the defendant’s rights, see infra § 21.6, Right to Appear Free of Physical Restraints.

**Statutory authorization and procedure for removal of noncapital defendant.** After warning a disruptive noncapital defendant, the trial judge may order the defendant removed from the trial if he or she continues to interrupt the proceedings. Unless impracticable, this warning and any subsequent order of removal must be made outside the presence of the jury. G.S. 15A-1032(a); see also State v. Rowe, 33 N.C. App. 611 (1977) (trial judge had no opportunity to warn defendant before removal where defendant violently threw counsel’s table, shouted obscenities at the judge, and continued shouting after he was physically restrained by officers and dragged to a corner of courtroom).

The judge must set forth on the record the reasons for the defendant’s removal and instruct the jury not to consider the defendant’s removal from the proceedings when weighing the evidence or determining the issue of guilt. G.S. 15A-1032(b); see also State v. Callahan, 93 N.C. App. 579, 584 (1989) (trial judge did not err by instructing jury on defendant’s “removal from the courtroom” rather than his “absence”).

After removal, the defendant must be given the opportunity to learn of the proceedings through counsel and to confer with counsel at reasonable intervals as directed by the court. G.S 15A-1032(b); see also State v. Brown, 19 N.C. App. 480 (1973) (defendant removed to an adjoining room from which he could listen to proceedings by intercom and speak with counsel by telephone). He or she must be given the opportunity to return to the courtroom “upon assurance of his [or her] good behavior.” G.S 15A-1032(b).

**Removal of disruptive capital defendant constitutionally prohibited.** It is a constitutional violation to remove a disruptive defendant from the courtroom during a capital trial if the trial is continued in his or her absence. State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1 (1989), vacated on other grounds, 497 U.S. 1021 (1990). However, a new trial need not be granted for such a violation if the State can show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cunningham, 344 N.C. 341 (1996) (defendant’s exclusions from the courtroom were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where he was able to observe all proceedings through an audio-video hookup and upon his return to the courtroom was able to object to anything that occurred in his absence).

**Practice note:** If your client is removed from trial for being disruptive, you should specifically object to the removal on statutory and state and federal constitutional grounds or the issue will be waived on appeal. See State v. Watson, 338 N.C. 168 (1994) (defendant’s failure to object to the alleged denial of his constitutional right to presence constituted a waiver of the right to argue the issue on appeal); State v. Miller, 146 N.C. App. 494 (2001) (same). You also should consider whether an instruction on the removal or absence would be helpful to your client’s case or whether it would call more attention to his or her absence. If you determine that you do not want the judge to instruct on the removal pursuant to G.S. 15A-1032(b)(2), you should inform the judge that you wish to waive that instruction. See State v. Ash, 169 N.C. App. 715, 726 (2005) (defense counsel specifically waived the instruction required by G.S. 15A-1032(b)(2) because they felt “it
will just call more attention to the fact that [defendant’s] not here”). If you want the instruction to be given and the judge fails to give it, you must object to the failure to instruct or the error will be waived.

G. Standard of Review on Appeal

The right to be present at all critical stages of the prosecution is subject to harmless error analysis. If the defendant’s constitutional right to presence is violated and the error is preserved, the State bears the burden of showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553 (1985); see also Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983). “[T]he presence of overwhelming evidence of guilt may render error of constitutional dimension harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Autry, 321 N.C. 392, 400 (1988).

21.2 Right to Confront Witnesses

This section addresses the state and federal constitutional right to confront and cross-examine witnesses only. It does not discuss strategies or procedures relating to cross-examination. For a discussion of cross-examination, see infra § 29.6, Witness Examination. For a discussion of the constitutional implications of remote testimony—i.e., testimony given by a witness outside of the defendant’s physical presence by way of a “live,” closed-circuit television system—see infra § 29.8, Remote Testimony.

A. Basis of Right


The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. This right is “‘[o]ne of the fundamental guarantees of life and liberty,’ and ‘a right long deemed so essential for the due protection of life and liberty that it is guarded against legislative and judicial action by provisions in the Constitution of the United States and in the constitutions of most if not of all the States composing the Union.’” Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965) (citation omitted).
**State constitution.** Article I, section 23 of the N.C. Constitution has a guarantee of the right to confront similar to that set out in the Sixth Amendment. *State v. Chandler*, 324 N.C. 172 (1989). This section secures to the defendant the right to have his or her witnesses in court and to examine them on his or her behalf. It also secures to the defendant a fair opportunity to prepare and present his or her defense. *See State v. Hackney*, 240 N.C. 230, 235 (1954) (discussing article I, section 11 of the N.C. Constitution of 1868, a precursor to article I, section 23 of the current version of the constitution).

The N.C. Supreme Court “has generally construed the right to confrontation under our state constitution consistent with the federal provision.” *State v. Fowler*, 353 N.C. 599, 614–15 (2001). The court “has repeatedly held that the right to confront is an affirmation of the rule of the common law that in criminal trials by jury the witness must not only be present, but must be subject to cross-examination under oath.” *State v. Perry*, 210 N.C. 796, 797 (1936).

**B. Waiver**

The right to confront is a personal privilege for the benefit of the defendant and, unlike the right to presence (discussed *supra* in § 21.1), is not a matter of public concern. Thus, the right to be confronted by witnesses may be waived, even in a capital case, by the defendant either by express consent or by a failure to assert the right in apt time. *State v. Braswell*, 312 N.C. 553 (1985); *State v. Moore*, 275 N.C. 198 (1969); *see also State v. Craven*, 312 N.C. 580 (1985) (by failing to request that a witness be recalled, defendant waived his right to confront her about her written note entered into evidence by the State after the witness had testified and left the courthouse).

This right may be waived by the defendant or by defense counsel acting on behalf of the defendant. *See State v. Splawn*, 23 N.C. App. 14 (1974) (right to confront waived by defense counsel’s stipulation in open court that the SBI chemist’s testimony could be taken, both on direct and cross-examination, on the day preceding the trial and then read to the jury at the trial by the court reporter).

**C. Standard of Review on Appeal**

The denial of a defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him or her is subject to harmless error analysis. *See State v. Braswell*, 312 N.C. 553 (1985). If the defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation is violated and the error is preserved, the State bears the burden of showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. *See State v. Morgan*, 359 N.C. 131 (2004).

**Practice note:** When making an objection based on the denial of the defendant’s right to confrontation, be sure to object on both state and federal constitutional grounds. Also, when making an objection to hearsay, be sure to give both the constitutional and hearsay grounds. *See State v. Gainey*, 355 N.C. 73 (2002) (defendant’s confrontation claim not
properly before the court on appeal because defendant objected at trial only on hearsay grounds).

D. Additional Resources


21.3 Right to Testify

A. Right to Testify

**Federal constitution.** The defendant has a constitutional right to take the witness stand and to testify in his or her own defense. This right is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. *Rock v. Arkansas*, 483 U.S. 44 (1987). Although not recognized at common law or specifically enumerated in the U.S. Constitution, this right is now accepted to be an inherent part of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment. *See id.; State v. Colson*, 186 N.C. App. 281 (2007).

**Statutory authority.** G.S. 8-54 provides that a criminal defendant is “at his own request, but not otherwise, a competent witness.” If a defendant decides to testify, he or she will be treated as any other witness and thereby subjects himself or herself “to all the disadvantages of that position.” *State v. Auston*, 223 N.C. 203, 205 (1943) (citations omitted). The defendant is subject to cross-examination and impeachment as is any other witness. *See id.; State v. Weaver*, 3 N.C. App. 439 (1969); *see also* G.S. 8-54.

**The decision whether to testify.** Whether to testify “is an important tactical decision as well as a matter of constitutional right.” *Brooks v. Tennessee*, 406 U.S. 605, 612 (1972). “[T]he decision whether to testify is a substantial right belonging to the defendant.” *State v. Luker*, 65 N.C. App. 644, 649 (1983) (counsel can advise defendant not to testify, but the ultimate decision belongs to the defendant), *aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds*, 311 N.C. 301 (1984); *see also* JOHN RUBIN & ALYSON A. GRINE, 1 NORTH CAROLINA DEFENDER MANUAL § 12.8A (Control and Direction of Case) (2d ed. 2013) (discussing decision-making in the attorney-client relationship); Appendix A, *infra*, N.C. COMM’N ON INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVS., PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE REPRESENTATION IN NON-CAPITAL CRIMINAL CASES AT THE TRIAL LEVEL, Guideline 7.6(b) Presenting the Defense Case (Nov. 2004) (“Counsel should discuss with the client all of the considerations relevant to the client’s decision to testify, including but not limited to, the likelihood of cross-examination and impeachment concerning prior convictions and prior bad acts that affect credibility.”).

If the defendant chooses to testify, the trial judge is not required to instruct the jury, on request or otherwise, that the defendant cannot be compelled to testify. *State v. Walden*,

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Waiver. A defendant may waive the constitutional right to testify as long as the waiver is knowing and voluntary. State v. Luker, 65 N.C. App. 644 (1983), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 311 N.C. 301 (1984). Unlike other waivers of constitutional rights, however, the trial judge is not required to inform a defendant of his or her right to testify or to make an inquiry on the record to determine whether his or her waiver is knowing and voluntary. State v. Carroll, 356 N.C. 526 (2002); see also State v. Hayes, 314 N.C. 460 (1985) (finding no denial of the right to testify because defendant did not indicate to the judge that he wished to testify). Nevertheless, trial judges are not prohibited from conducting an inquiry, and it is a common practice for trial judges, sua sponte or at the request of defense counsel, to inquire of the defendant to determine whether the waiver of the right to testify is made knowingly, voluntarily, and understandingly. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 359 N.C. 77 (2004); Carroll, 356 N.C. 526.

Impermissible chilling of the defendant’s right to testify. The trial judge, by his or her statements or conduct, should not impermissibly chill the defendant’s right to testify. For example, a delay in ruling on, or the erroneous denial of, a motion in limine could have an unacceptable chilling effect on a defendant’s right to testify. Compare State v. Lamb, 321 N.C. 633 (1988) (new trial granted where the bald denial of defendant’s motion in limine to exclude inadmissible evidence implicating her in other killings impermissibly chilled the defendant’s right to take the stand in her own defense), with State v. Barber, 120 N.C. App. 505 (1995) (no impermissible chilling of the right to testify where judge declined to rule on defendant’s motion in limine to suppress evidence of underlying facts of prior convictions where the evidence did not clearly show that defendant’s decision whether to testify rested solely on the judge’s decision on the motion, and the judge did not erroneously deny the motion but deferred the decision until he had more facts and assured defendant that he would not admit impermissible evidence). Whether the denial of a defendant’s motion in limine impermissibly chills his or her right to testify “depends on the peculiar facts of each case.” Lamb, 321 N.C. 633, 648.

Likewise, if the trial judge undertakes to advise the defendant about the legal consequences of taking the stand, he or she may impermissibly chill the defendant’s free exercise of that right by giving erroneous advice. See State v. Autry, 321 N.C. 392 (1988) (error found where trial judge gave a defendant an incorrect explanation about the scope of cross-examination to which the defendant could have been subjected). If the judge correctly advises the defendant in general on the consequences of testifying, there is not an impermissible chilling effect on a defendant’s right to testify. See State v. Davis, 349 N.C. 1 (1998) (no error where trial judge did not attempt to give the defendant detailed instruction on the scope of cross-examination, and defendant had discussed the consequences of testifying with his attorneys); see also State v. Davis, 353 N.C. 1 (2000) (no error by failure to give more detailed instructions to defendant about cross-examination; instructions were not inaccurate); State v. Little, ___ N.C. App. ___, 799.
S.E.2d 427 (2017) (holding that since there is no obligation for a trial judge to inform a defendant of the possible consequences of the decision to testify, the trial judge was not required to balance his colloquy with defendant about the impeachment consequences of testifying with an instruction on the advantages of testifying).

B. Right Not to Take the Stand

**Constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.** A defendant has a right to refuse to testify under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, and also under article I, section 23 of the N.C. Constitution. A defendant’s exercise of this right may not be used against him or her, and any reference by the State to a defendant’s failure to testify violates the defendant’s constitutional rights. *See Griffin v. California*, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); *State v. Mitchell*, 353 N.C. 309 (2001).

**Statutory privilege against self-incrimination.** G.S. 8-54 likewise recognizes that, although the defendant has the right to testify if he or she so chooses, nothing in that statute renders a criminal defendant “competent or compellable to give evidence against himself,” nor does it “render any person compellable to answer any question tending to criminate himself.”

**Right not to be called as witness.** The right of a defendant not to testify means not only that the defendant has the right not to take the stand but also that the court, the State, and a co-defendant in a joint trial may not call the defendant as a witness. *See Jones v. State*, 586 A.2d 55 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991).

The State may require a defendant to stand or otherwise exhibit himself or herself before the jury as long as the act is relevant and is not of a testimonial or communicative nature. Such an exhibition has been held not to violate the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Likewise, a defendant should be allowed to challenge the State’s evidence by exhibiting himself or herself before the jury, if the exhibition is relevant and non-testimonial, without being subjected to cross-examination or impeachment. For further discussion of this topic, see *infra* § 27.2C, View of the Defendant’s Appearance or Physical Characteristics to Rebut the State’s Case.

**Comment on the exercise of the right not to testify.** Prosecutors are strictly prohibited from making any reference to a defendant’s failure to testify. *See State v. Reid*, 334 N.C. 551 (1993) (new trial granted where prosecutor argued that defendant had not testified, that he had that right, and that the jury was not to hold it against him); *see also Baxter v. Palmigiano*, 425 U.S. 308, 319 (1976) (holding that the trial judge and prosecutor are prohibited from suggesting to the jury that it may treat a defendant’s silence as substantive evidence of guilt); *State v. Baymon*, 336 N.C. 748 (1994) (new trial granted where prosecutor’s argument directly referred to defendant’s failure to testify and was intended to disparage defendant in the eyes of the jury); *see also infra* § 33.7C, Impermissible Content (discussing impermissible closing arguments by prosecution).
Judges likewise may not comment on the defendant’s failure to testify except, if requested by the defendant, to instruct the jury on the right not to testify (discussed further below).

Defense counsel may refer to the defendant’s right not to testify in closing argument by reading the Fifth Amendment and G.S. 8-54. The cases also indicate that defense counsel may use words to that effect and may paraphrase that right. See State v. Banks, 322 N.C. 753, 764 (1988) (defense counsel should have been permitted to read that clause of the Fifth Amendment pertinent to the defendant’s right not to testify and “to say simply that because of this provision, the jury must not consider defendant’s election not to testify adversely to him, or words to this effect”); State v. Bovender, 233 N.C. 683, 690 (1951) (“mere statement by defendants’ counsel that the law says no man has to take the witness stand would seem to be unobjectionable”). Defense counsel is not allowed to comment on or explain further why the defendant did not testify. Bovender, 233 N.C. 683, 689–90 (so holding because permitting extended comment by defense counsel “would open the door for the prosecution and create a situation the statute was intended to prevent”).

Defense counsel also has the right to inquire of prospective jurors during jury selection about their ability to follow the law, including the laws on the defendant’s right not to testify. See State v. Blankenship, 337 N.C. 543, 554–55 (1994).

**Instruction on the effect of the decision not to testify.** If the defendant requests an instruction on his or her decision not to testify, the trial judge is required by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to give one. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305 (1981) (the failure to give the requested prophylactic instruction “exacts an impermissible toll on the full and free exercise of the privilege”); see also State v. Sanders, 288 N.C. 285 (1975) (there is no mandatory formula for instructing the jury on a defendant’s decision not to testify but an instruction is sufficient if it makes clear to the jury that the defendant has the right to offer or to refrain from offering evidence as he or she sees fit and that the failure to testify should not raise any adverse inference).

Absent a request, it is discretionary with the trial judge whether to instruct the jury on the defendant’s decision not to testify. The appellate courts have emphasized, however, that it is the “better practice” for a judge not to give such an instruction unless it is requested by the defendant. See State v. Barbour, 278 N.C. 449 (1971); State v. Powell, 11 N.C. App. 465 (1971).

**Practice note:** If you believe that an instruction on the defendant’s decision not to testify would be helpful, you should specifically request that the judge instruct the jury that the defendant has not testified, that the law gives him or her that privilege, that the decision creates no presumption against him or her, and that the defendant’s silence is not to influence their decision in any way. See N.C. Pattern Jury Instruction—Crim. 101.30 (May 2005); see also Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 301 (stating that without an instruction on the defendant’s decision not to testify, “the jury is left to roam at large with only its untutored instincts to guide it, to draw from the defendant’s silence broad inferences of guilt”).
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the giving of a “no-inference” instruction, over the defendant’s objection, does not violate the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333 (1978). However, if the judge indicates that he or she intends to give a “no-inference” instruction and you do not want one, be sure to object so that any error will be preserved on appeal. See State v. Bennett, 308 N.C. 530 (1983) (where defendant failed to object to the trial judge’s instruction on the defendant’s failure to testify, the error would be reviewed for “plain error” only). Include as a basis for your objection the state constitutional right not to testify under article I, section 23 of the N.C. Constitution. See also State v. Bryant, 283 N.C. 227, 233 (1973) (“Some jurisdictions hold that unless the defendant so requests, such an instruction tends to accentuate the significance of his silence and thus impinges upon defendant’s unfettered right to testify or not to testify at his option.” (citing 18 A.L.R.3d 1335)).

Additional resources. For a further discussion of the privilege against self-incrimination, see Robert Farb, Fifth Amendment Privilege and Grant of Immunity, N.C. SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK (May 2014).

21.4 Right to Allocution

A. Purpose

Allocution, or a defendant’s right to make a statement on his or her own behalf before the pronouncement of a sentence, was a right granted to a defendant at common law. State v. Miller, 137 N.C. App. 450, 460 (2000). The purpose of common law allocution was to give the defendant the opportunity “to present legal grounds why sentence ought not be pronounced.” State v. Green, 336 N.C. 142, 191 (1994) (citing State v. Johnson, 67 N.C. 55 (1872)). The grounds included that the defendant “was not the person convicted, he had the benefit of clergy, he was insane, or, if a woman, she was pregnant.” Green, 336 N.C. 142, 191. The purpose of modern-day allocution is “to afford defendant an opportunity to state any further information which the trial court might consider when determining the sentence to be imposed.” See State v. Rankins, 133 N.C. App. 607, 613 (1999). For a thorough discussion of the purposes of allocution in modern times, see State v. Chow, 883 P.2d 663 (Haw. Ct. App. 1994).

B. Basis of Right

Federal constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court has not decided whether a defendant who affirmatively requests to speak at sentencing has the right to do so under the U.S. Constitution. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 219 n.22 (1971), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1972); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962); see also United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803 (4th Cir. 2000); Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 1998).
Federal circuit courts are split on whether the federal constitution grants a defendant this right. Compare, e.g., Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing a due process right to allocution at sentencing), and Ashe v. North Carolina, 586 F.2d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 1978) ("[W]hen a defendant effectively communicates his desire to the trial judge to speak prior to the imposition of sentence, it is a denial of due process not to grant the defendant’s request.") with United States v. Li, 115 F.3d 125, 132 (2d Cir. 1997) (the right to allocution “is a matter of criminal procedure and not a constitutional right”), and United States v. Fleming, 849 F.2d 568, 569 (11th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he right to allocution is not constitutional.” (emphasis in original)).

State constitution. The N.C. Supreme Court has held that capital defendants have no constitutional right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding. See State v. Moseley, 338 N.C. 1 (1994); State v. Green, 336 N.C. 142 (1994). Additionally, no state constitutional right to allocution has been recognized in noncapital cases. The question has been raised in previous cases but not specifically decided by North Carolina’s appellate courts. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 137 N.C. App. 450 (2000); State v. Rankins, 133 N.C. App. 607 (1999).

Statutory right to allocution in misdemeanor and noncapital felony cases. G.S. 15A-1334(b) codifies the common law right of allocution and expressly gives a defendant in misdemeanor and noncapital felony cases the right to “make a statement in his own behalf” at the sentencing hearing. State v. Miller, 137 N.C. App. 450 (2000). The defendant must request the opportunity to speak before the pronouncement of sentence or the right is lost. See State v. Rankins, 133 N.C. App. 607 (1999) (defendant was properly denied the opportunity to address the court where the request came after the jury had returned its verdict and the trial judge had already imposed sentence).

Neither the constitution nor G.S. 15A-1334 requires the trial judge to address the defendant personally and ask whether he or she wishes to make a statement. See Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962) (a defendant has no federal constitutional right to be asked if he or she wishes to address the court before sentencing); State v. Poole, 305 N.C. 308, 325 (1982) (“While it may be the better practice for the trial court specifically to inquire if the defendant wishes to speak prior to sentencing, our statute does not command this practice.”); cf. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) (before imposing sentence a federal sentencing judge must “address the defendant personally in order to permit the defendant to speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence”). However, if the defendant requests an opportunity to address the court before being sentenced and he or she is denied the right to allocute under G.S. 15A-1334(b), a new sentencing hearing must be ordered. See Miller, 137 N.C. App. 450; see also State v. Flake, ___ N.C. App. ___, 790 S.E.2d 752 (2016) (unpublished); State v. Ferrell, 233 N.C. App. 599 (2014) (unpublished).

A new sentencing hearing will also be ordered if a trial judge impermissibly chills the defendant’s right to allocute. See State v. Jones, ___ N.C. App. ___, 802 S.E.2d 518, 526 (2017) (new sentencing hearing awarded where trial judge acknowledged defendant’s explicit request to allocute but then made a series of negative comments and
“abruptly entered judgment without giving the defendant an opportunity to speak”); State v. Griffin, 109 N.C. App. 131, 133 (1993) (finding defendant’s right to speak under G.S. 15A-1334(b) was effectively chilled by trial judge’s comment that it “would be a big mistake” for defendant to testify at the sentencing hearing).

**Practice note:** Counsel should discuss with the defendant the advantages and disadvantages of allocution. The U.S. Supreme Court has observed that even “[t]he most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself.” See Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961). On the other hand, a defendant may do harm to his or her cause by speaking. See State v. Divinie, 229 N.C. App. 197 (2013) (unpublished) (noting that the exercise of the right to speak entails risk and finding that the trial judge, in ordering consecutive sentences, was entitled to take into account defendant’s apparent lack of remorse evidenced by the statements he made at sentencing). Moreover, should the case be reversed and a new trial granted, any admissions the defendant makes may be used against him or her. See Caren Myers, Note, Encouraging Allocution at Capital Sentencing: A Proposal for Use Immunity, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 787 (1997).

**Allocation in capital cases.** The N.C. Supreme Court has held that defendants in North Carolina have no common law or statutory right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding. See State v. Moseley, 338 N.C. 1 (1994); State v. Green, 336 N.C. 142 (1994). The only remnant of the common law right of allocution in capital cases in North Carolina “is the right to present strictly legal arguments to the presiding judge as to why no judgment should be entered.” Green, 336 N.C. 142, 192.

Since G.S. 15A-1334(b), by its own terms, is restricted to noncapital cases, it does not apply when the defendant is charged with a capital offense. See Green, 336 N.C. 142. The statute applicable to capital sentencing proceedings, G.S. 15A-2000(a)(4), has no provision for a defendant to make an unsworn statement of fact or to testify without being subject to cross-examination. It merely provides that a defendant or defense counsel has the right to “present argument for or against sentence of death.” See State v. Ray, 137 N.C. App. 326, 331 (2000).

Although no absolute right of allocution in capital cases is recognized in North Carolina, the trial judge nevertheless may be willing to grant a defendant’s request to make a statement. See, e.g., Moseley, 338 N.C. 1 (finding no error where trial judge failed to afford the capital defendant the opportunity to allocute even though defendant’s motion for allocution had been granted before jury selection, because the defendant failed to remind the judge to allow him to speak at the appropriate time); State v. Reeves, 337 N.C. 700 (1994) (trial judge did not express an opinion on a fact to be proved when he allowed the capital defendant’s request to allocate but required him to speak from a position that was a greater distance from the jury than the distance from which the attorneys argued).

**Practice note:** If, after weighing the risks detailed in the previous practice note, you believe that it would be helpful for a capital jury to hear your client speak during the
sentencing phase—for example, to express remorse or plead for leniency—you should make a motion to allow the defendant to address the jury. You should cite the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution as well as article I, sections 19 and 23 of the N.C. Constitution and argue that it is important for the defendant to be allowed to speak for himself or herself to the jury because it is the jurors who must make the ultimate decision whether to impose the death penalty. You also can argue that the Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar Association has recommended that the “offender should be permitted the right of allocution” at the sentencing hearing. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE SENTENCING THIRD EDITION, Standard 18-5.17 (1994). A sample motion to permit allocution is available on the Office of Indigent Defense Services website in the Capital Trial Motions Index, under the Beginning of Sentencing Phase heading (Motion to Allow Defendant to Address the Jury).

Additional resources. For further discussion of the history of the right to allocate and the informative results of a survey of judges’ views on allocution, see Mark W. Bennet & Ira P. Robbins, Last Words: A Survey and Analysis of Federal Judges’ Views on Allocation in Sentencing, 65 ALA. L. REV. 735 (2013).

21.5 Right to Appear in Civilian Clothes

A. Basis of Right

Federal constitution. Trial of a defendant in prison garb has been recognized as an affront to the dignity of the proceedings and as jeopardizing a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial; thus, the State may not compel a defendant to appear for trial before a jury in identifiable prison or jail clothing. The constant reminder of a defendant’s condition implicit in prison attire may affect a juror’s judgment and thereby endanger the presumption of innocence by creating an unacceptable risk that the jury will impermissibly consider that circumstance in rendering its verdict. Unlike the need to impose physical restraints on unruly defendants, “compelling an accused to wear jail clothing furthers no essential state policy.” Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 505 (1976).

The U.S. Supreme Court in Estelle also recognized that defendants who are compelled to stand trial in prison garb are usually “only those who cannot post bail prior to trial” and to “impose the condition on one category of defendant, over objection, would be repugnant to the concept of equal justice embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 505–06.

Whether a defendant was prejudiced by being compelled to stand trial while wearing prison attire is subject to harmless error analysis on appeal. The State has the burden of showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Statutory right to wear civilian clothes in superior court. To protect a defendant’s right to be tried in clothing other than prison garb, North Carolina law prohibits any sheriff, jailer, or other officer from requiring a defendant to appear for trial in superior court
dressed in the uniform of a prisoner or in any apparel other than ordinary civilian dress (or with a shaven head unless it was shaven while the defendant was serving a term of imprisonment for the commission of a crime). A violation of this prohibition is a Class 1 misdemeanor. G.S. 15-176. Since the statute applies only to trials, defendants are not entitled to wear civilian clothing at pretrial hearings.

While it is unlawful for an official to require a defendant to appear for trial in prison garb, it is not necessarily unlawful for a defendant to so appear. Where a defendant is given the opportunity to obtain alternate clothing but refuses to do so, he or she may stand trial in a prison uniform. See State v. Westry, 15 N.C. App. 1 (1972).

The N.C. Court of Appeals has held that although a defendant may not be required to wear the clothing of a prisoner or convict, G.S. 15-176 does not prohibit requiring the defendant to wear an unobtrusive form of identification, such as a wristband. See State v. Johnson, 128 N.C. App. 361 (1998).

Civilian clothes in district court. The above cases and statutes do not recognize a right for a defendant to wear civilian clothes in district court. The holding in Estelle applies only to trials “before a jury.” See Estelle, 425 U.S. 501, 512. G.S. 15-176 applies only to trials in superior court.

Some of the reasons for not requiring a defendant to appear in jail clothing have been recognized, however, as potentially applicable to cases tried before a judge.

There are considerations here other than possible bias. These considerations were undoubtedly overlooked in the press of immediate decision. One is equality before the law. A defendant who can afford bail appears for trial in the best array he can muster. He may be a veritable satyr clad like Hyperion himself. Imposition of jail clothing on a defendant who cannot afford bail subjects him to inferior treatment. He suffers a disadvantage as a result of his poverty. Our traditions do not brook such disadvantage. The second consideration is psychological. Some defendants may be callous; others confused and embarrassed by prison garb to the point where they may be handicapped in presenting or assisting their defense. Presumed to be innocent, the prisoner is entitled to as much dignity and respect as safety allows. As one court tersely put it: “The presumption of innocence requires the garb of innocence . . . .” (Eaddy v. People, 115 Colo. 488 [174 P.2d 717, 718].)

People v. Zapata, 220 Cal. App. 2d 903, 911 (1963) (footnote omitted) (holding that these considerations apply to a trial before a judge, but that the error did not cause a miscarriage of justice and did not require reversal); see also State v. Billups, 301 N.C. 607, 617 (1981) (Exum, J., dissenting) (dissenters observed in a case before a jury involving shackling [discussed infra in § 21.6, Right to Appear Free of Physical Restraints] that “the presumption of innocence requires the garb of innocence, for
‘regardless of the ultimate outcome, or of the evidence awaiting presentation, every defendant is entitled to be brought before the court with the appearance, dignity, and self-respect of a free and innocent man’” (citations omitted)).

**Practice note:** In light of the lack of authority guaranteeing a defendant the right to appear in civilian clothing in a nonjury trial, if you would like your client to appear in civilian clothing for trial before a district court judge, you should make that request to the judge before trial and show why requiring your client to appear in jail clothing would deny his or her due process right to a fair trial in that case. For example, in a case that turns on eyewitness identification, the defendant’s appearance in jail clothing could influence the witnesses’ testimony (in addition to implicating the more general concerns discussed above).

**Statutory right for defense witnesses to appear in civilian clothes in superior court.**

G.S. 15-176 also provides that it is unlawful for any sheriff, jailer, or other officer to require any prisoner to appear in any court for trial while dressed in prison garb. Violations of this prohibition are Class 1 misdemeanors. G.S. 15-176; see also State v. Knight, 87 N.C. App. 125 (1987) (trial judge did not abuse discretion in denying defendant’s motion for mistrial; the jailer wrongfully brought a defense witness into the courtroom in his jail uniform and handcuffed, but the appearance was brief and the judge immediately ordered the witness removed and declared a recess while the witness changed into civilian clothing).

**Practice note:** If you wish to have a defense witness testify while wearing civilian clothes, you should ensure that the witness has access to appropriate clothes and request that the jailer produce the witness for court in the civilian clothes. If the jailer does not comply, you must make a motion on the record for the witness to appear in civilian clothes or the error will be waived on appeal. See State v. Abraham, 338 N.C. 315 (1994) (no abuse of discretion found where defense counsel made no specific motion to permit three incarcerated defense witnesses to appear in civilian clothes and the trial judge required the witnesses to testify while in prison uniform and physically restrained).

**B. Preservation of Issue for Appeal**

**Necessity for objection.** The failure of a defendant to object to being tried in prison clothing “is sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation.” Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512–13 (1976); cf. State v. Tolley, 290 N.C. 349, 371–72 (1976) (citing Estelle and finding that any error in shackling of defendant was waived because defense counsel made no objection). Counsel must specifically assert a constitutional and statutory basis for the objection to preserve the issue on both grounds on appeal. See generally State v. Holmes, 355 N.C. 719 (2002) (where defendant failed to object on constitutional grounds, review of the trial judge’s decision to restrain was limited to statutory error pursuant to the abuse of discretion standard). The trial judge is not required to inquire of the defendant or defense counsel whether the defendant is deliberately going to trial in jail clothes. Estelle, 425 U.S. 501.
21.6 Right to Appear Free of Physical Restraints

A. Constitutional Basis of Right

Federal constitution. The due process and fair trial guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution prohibit the use of physical restraints visible to the jury unless the trial judge has determined, in the exercise of his or her discretion, that the restraints are justified by an essential state interest specific to a particular trial. See Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005). Examples of essential state interests include physical security, escape prevention, and courtroom decorum. Courts can take into account factors traditionally relied on by courts in determining potential security problems and the risk of escape at trial. A non-exhaustive list of factors appropriately used to determine whether restraints are necessary is set out below.

The U.S. Supreme Court observed that the routine use of shackling would:

- undermine the presumption of innocence and the related fairness of the fact-finding process;
- interfere with the defendant’s ability to communicate with his or her lawyer and to participate in his or her own defense; and
- affront the dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings.

Id. at 630–32.

Where a trial judge, without adequate justification, orders a defendant to be visibly shackled during trial, the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make out a due process violation. Instead, the burden is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the shackling error did not contribute to the verdict obtained against the defendant. Id. at 635.
State constitution. Before the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in *Deck v. Missouri*, 544 U.S. 622 (2005), the N.C. Supreme Court recognized that a criminal defendant is entitled under the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution and the Law of the Land Clause in article I, section 19 of the state constitution to be tried “free from all bonds or shackles except in extraordinary instances.” See *State v. Tolley*, 290 N.C. 349, 365 (1976). Unless there is a showing of necessity, compelling a defendant to stand trial while physically restrained is inherently prejudicial. *Id.*

While *Tolley* involved a superior court jury trial, it can also be argued that the state and federal constitutions likewise bar physical restraint of a defendant in a district court nonjury proceeding unless the judge finds that it is necessary to do so (see subsection B., below).

Factors relevant to consideration. The court in *Tolley* set out circumstances appropriate for the trial judge to consider in determining whether restraints are necessary. These include but are not limited to:

- the seriousness of the charges,
- the defendant’s temperament and character,
- the defendant’s age and physical attributes,
- the defendant’s past record,
- any past escapes or attempted escapes, and evidence of a present plan to escape,
- any threats to harm others or cause a disturbance,
- any self-destructive tendencies,
- the risk of mob violence or of attempted revenge by others,
- the possibility of rescue by other offenders still at large,
- the size and mood of the audience,
- the nature and physical security of the courtroom, and
- the adequacy and availability of alternative remedies.

*State v. Tolley*, 290 N.C. 349, 368–69 (1976) (“The propriety of physical restraints depends upon the particular facts of each case, and the test on appeal is whether, under all of the circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion.”).

Type of restraint. The appropriateness of the particular type of restraint also appears to depend on the circumstances of each case. Compare *State v. Forrest*, 168 N.C. App. 614 (2005) (no abuse of discretion by trial judge in requiring defendant to appear in court strapped to his chair, handcuffed and wearing a white mask covering his mouth and nose, Hannibal-Lecter-style, where defendant was on trial for brutally attacking his former attorney and biting a deputy during a previous trial), with *State v. Locklear*, 231 N.C. App. 714 (2014) (unpublished) (trial judge lacked a sufficient basis to require defendant to wear a “stun vest” under his clothing that was operated by a uniformed officer seated on the row behind defendant where the State had presented only unsworn information that jail personnel recommended the use of the vest based on unspecified incidents that had taken place at the jail involving defendant and his co-defendants).
Hearing required as constitutional matter. To comply with due process considerations, when a trial judge contemplates the use of visible restraints, he or she must state for the record, outside the jury’s presence, the specific reasons for ordering the restraints. See State v. Tolley, 290 N.C. 349, 368 (1976). The trial judge must also give defense counsel an opportunity to voice objections and to persuade the judge that such measures are not necessary. Regardless of whether the trial judge chooses to hold a formal or informal hearing, a meaningful record must be made that reflects the reasons for the action taken by the judge and indicates “that counsel have been afforded an opportunity to controvert these reasons and thrash out any resulting factual questions.” Id. at 369.

The obligation to hold a hearing and provide a meaningful record is not excused when attempts are made to conceal the use of shackles or other restraints from the jury. Even if the restraints are not visible to the jury, “the concerns that shackling interferes with the defendant’s thought processes and communications with counsel, and affronts the dignity of the trial process, are not cured by mere concealment from the jury.” State v. Jackson, 162 N.C. App. 695, 701 (2004) (cautioning trial judges in the practice of shackling “to adhere to the proper use of their discretion and provide the rationale for that discretion, via some finding substantiated in the record” even if the jury will not be made aware of the restraints).

Statutory hearing requirements also apply, discussed below.

B. Statutory Basis of Right

Restraint of adult defendants in superior court. G.S. 15A-1031 reflects the concerns about shackling expressed in State v. Tolley, 290 N.C. 349 (1976), and provides that a defendant may be physically restrained during his or her trial only “when the judge finds the restraint to be reasonably necessary to maintain order, prevent the defendant’s escape, or provide for the safety of persons.” Under this statute, if the trial judge determines that a defendant should be restrained, he or she must:

- enter in the record out of the presence of the jury and in the presence of the person to be restrained and his or her counsel, if any, the reasons for the restraint;
- give the restrained person an opportunity to object; and
- unless the defendant or his or her attorney objects, instruct the jurors that the restraint is not to be considered in weighing evidence or determining the issue of guilt.

See G.S. 15A-1031. If the defendant objects to the stated reasons for the restraint, the judge must conduct a hearing and make findings of fact. Id. The judge may base his or her findings supporting the decision to use restraints on information, if reliable, that would not be admissible at trial. State v. Paige, 316 N.C. 630 (1986) (permissible to consider hearsay testimony from deputy that defendants had attempted to escape the week before trial). The judge must make a “meaningful record” evidencing the basis of his or her discretion and “provide the rationale for that discretion, via some finding substantiated in the record.” State v. Jackson, 162 N.C. App. 695, 701 (2004).
Restraint of adult defendants in district court. While G.S. 15A-1031 discusses the procedures for the court to follow in a jury trial (for example, the judge must instruct the jury not to consider the restraints unless the defendant objects to the instruction), it is not expressly limited to jury trials. Its language and title allow for the argument that a district court judge is prohibited from trying a defendant while shackled. The statute is part of Subchapter X, General Trial Procedure, which is applicable both to superior and district court. Also, the reasons articulated by Deck and Tolley, discussed in subsection A., above, apply to bench trials as well as to jury trials (other than the potential impact on the presumption of innocence and the fairness of the factfinding process when a lay jury is the factfinder).

Practice note: If your district court client is shackled and you would like him or her to be tried free of restraints, you should make a motion to have them removed and assert that G.S. 15A-1031 requires that the shackles be removed. You should also assert that the denial of your motion without holding a hearing and making the findings described in Tolley violates your client’s rights to due process under the state and federal constitutions. You can argue that even though one of the reasons that physical restraints are inherently prejudicial is not present when the proceeding is not in front a jury—i.e., that the physical restraints may cause jury prejudice and affect the presumption of innocence—there are other reasons to restrict their use in district court. Shackles may:

- impair the defendant’s mental faculties;
- impede communication between the defendant and his or her attorney;
- detract from the dignity and decorum of the judicial proceedings; and
- be painful to the defendant.


You also can cite G.S. 7B-2402.1 (discussed below) in support of your motion and argue that by enacting this statute limiting the restraint of juveniles, the General Assembly recognized the importance of subjecting a person to physical restraint only after a judicial determination of need even in nonjury proceedings. See also In re Staley, 364 N.E.2d 72, 73–74 (Ill. 1977) (holding in juvenile delinquency case that “[t]he reasons for forbidding shackling are not limited to trials by jury” and that in the absence of a showing of clear necessity “an accused cannot be tried in shackles whether there is to be a bench trial or a trial by jury”).

Restraint of juveniles. G.S. 7B-2402.1, enacted in 2007, provides that in a delinquency hearing, “the judge may subject a juvenile to physical restraint in the courtroom only when the judge finds the restraint to be reasonably necessary to maintain order, prevent the juvenile’s escape, or provide for the safety of the courtroom.” These restrictions are comparable to those in the statute on restraint of adult defendants, discussed above.
Before ordering the use of restraints, the judge, whenever practical, must provide the juvenile and his or her attorney an opportunity to be heard to contest the use of restraints.

**Restraint of witnesses during trial.** G.S. 15A-1031 also grants the trial judge the authority to restrain witnesses. The procedures applicable to the restraint of the defendant, described above, also are applicable to the restraint of witnesses. Whether to restrain a witness is a discretionary decision and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See *State v. Abraham*, 338 N.C. 315 (1994) (no abuse of discretion or expression of opinion on credibility shown where trial judge permitted incarcerated prosecuting witness to appear without shackles but required three incarcerated defense witnesses to be restrained while testifying).

**C. Preservation of Issue for Appeal**

**Record must affirmatively show physical restraint.** To preserve the right to appellate review, the record must show that the defendant was physically restrained. The burden is on the defendant to show that restraints were employed. See *State v. Valentine*, 200 N.C. App. 436 (2009) (unpublished) (overruling assignment of error because defendant failed to demonstrate that he was in fact shackled at trial).

**Necessity for objection.** Appellate review is waived if counsel fails to object to the trial judge’s order of restraint. See *State v. Sellers*, ___ N.C. App. ___, 782 S.E.2d 86 (2016) (holding that defendant waived the right to appeal shackling issue where no objection was made at trial); *State v. Thomas*, 134 N.C. App. 560 (1999) (same); see also *State v. Paige*, 316 N.C. 630 (1986) (holding that the defendant’s failure to object to the trial court’s lack of instructions to the jury that restraints could not be considered in weighing evidence or determining guilt waived the right to review the lack of instructions); *State v. Tolley*, 290 N.C. 349 (1976) (holding that the defendant waived the right to appeal the lack of instructions concerning shackles and to shackling itself by failing to object). A constitutional and statutory basis for the objection must be given to preserve the issue on both grounds on appeal. See *State v. Holmes*, 355 N.C. 719 (2002) (where defendant failed to object on constitutional grounds, review of the trial judge’s decision to restrain was limited to statutory error pursuant to the abuse of discretion standard).

**Practice note:** If the trial judge, over objection, orders the defendant or a defense witness to be physically restrained during trial, counsel should request that the jury’s view of the restraints be obstructed and that the defendant or witness walk to and from the witness chair outside the presence of the jury. See, e.g., *State v. Wilson*, 354 N.C. 493 (2001) (defendant’s leg braces were hidden underneath his clothing); *State v. Atkins*, 349 N.C. 62 (1998) (cloth was draped over defense table to conceal defendant’s leg restraints from jury); *State v. Wright*, 82 N.C. App. 450 (1986) (oversized briefcase placed by defendant’s chair to obstruct jurors’ view of his shackles). If the restraints are not visible to the jury, the risk is reduced that the restraints will create prejudice in the minds of the jurors. *See Holmes*, 355 N.C. 719. However, the restraints may still impede the defendant’s thought processes and ease of communication with counsel.
To preserve any error for appeal, make sure the record reflects that the defendant was in fact restrained during trial. Also identify the type of restraints used and the effect that the restraints had on the defendant and the proceedings.