

8.7 *Apprendi* and *Blakely* Issues

A. The Decisions

In *Apprendi v. New Jersey*, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the Supreme Court held that any fact (other than a prior conviction) that increases the punishment for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be included in the charging instrument, submitted to the jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. *Id.* at 476.¹ In *Blakely v. Washington*, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), the Court elaborated on the meaning of statutory maximum, holding “that the ‘statutory maximum’ for *Apprendi* purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose *solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.*” *Id.* at 303 (emphasis in original). In *State v. Allen*, 359 N.C. 425 (2005), *opinion withdrawn on other grounds*, 360 N.C. 569 (2006), the N.C. Supreme Court recognized that North Carolina’s structured sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment requirement that any factor, other than a prior conviction, that increases the defendant’s maximum sentence be alleged in the pleading, submitted to the jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

In response to these decisions, the General Assembly revised the procedures for determining aggravating factors in the “Blakely Bill” (2005 N.C. Sess. Laws Ch. 145 (H 822)), effective for offenses committed on or after June 30, 2005. The Blakely Bill applies to structured sentencing for felonies in both district and superior court and requires that the finder of fact determine aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt unless admitted by the defendant. Additionally, the Blakely Bill changed the procedures for pleading or providing notice of aggravating factors and certain prior record points, as discussed below.

For a further analysis of the impact of *Blakely* on determining and weighing aggravating factors and prior record points, see 2 NORTH CAROLINA DEFENDER MANUAL § 24.1E (Right to Jury Verdict on Every Element of Offense, Including “Sentencing” Factors) (UNC School of Government, 2d ed. 2012); JOHN RUBIN & SHEA RIGGSBEE DENNING, PUNISHMENTS FOR NORTH CAROLINA CRIMES AND MOTOR VEHICLE OFFENSES 1-3 (UNC School of Government, Supp. 2008), available at <http://sogpubs.unc.edu/electronicversions/pdfs/punchtsuppl08.pdf>; Jessica Smith, *North Carolina Sentencing after Blakely v. Washington and the Blakely Bill* (UNC School of Government, Sept. 2005), available at www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/Blakely%20Update.pdf.

1. In a footnote in *Apprendi*, the Court stated that it was not reaching the question of whether the states are bound by the Fifth Amendment requirement that crimes be charged in a grand jury indictment. 530 U.S. at 477 n.3. However, the defendant has a Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to notice of the charges against him or her, and pleadings ordinarily must allege all the elements of the offense. See generally *State v. Hunt*, 357 N.C. 257 (2003) (recognizing these principles, but finding that North Carolina statutes authorize short-form indictments for murder and such indictments are sufficient to put defendants on notice of statutory capital aggravating factors).

B. Notice and Pleading Requirements after *Blakely*

Aggravating factors and prior record points for structured sentencing felonies. In addition to the other pleading requirements, the Blakely Bill requires that every indictment (or information if an indictment is waived) allege any “catch all” aggravating factors under G.S. 15A-1340.16(d)(20) that it intends to use. The State does not need to allege in the indictment the aggravating factors specifically enumerated in G.S. 15A-1340.16(d)(1) through (19) except the aggravating factor in G.S. 15A-1340.16(d)(9) (offense directly related to public office or employment held by defendant). *See* G.S. 15A-1340.16(f) (requiring that indictment allege this aggravating factor); *see also* 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws Ch. 193 (H 153) (amending several statutes to require forfeiture of retirement benefits on conviction with this aggravating factor).

The State still must give written notice of aggravating factors it intends to use at least 30 days before trial or plea of guilty or no contest unless the defendant waives notice. *See* G.S. 15A-1340.16(a4), (a6); *see also State v. Mackey*, 209 N.C. App. 116 (2011) (State did not provide proper notice of intent to pursue aggravating factors by giving defendant plea offer letter stating that defendant “qualified for aggravated sentencing” under two enumerated aggravating factors; letter did not indicate that State intended to proffer these factors in court proceedings).

Similarly, the State need not allege in the indictment, but must provide 30-days’ notice in writing of its intent to prove, the prior record level point in G.S. 15A-1340.14(b)(7) (defendant committed the offense while on probation, parole, or post-release supervision, while serving a sentence of imprisonment, or while on escape from a correctional facility during a sentence of imprisonment). The applicable statutes do not require the State to provide written notice (or allege in the indictment) either prior convictions or the prior record point in G.S. 15A-1340.14(b)(6) (all elements of present offense are included in a prior offense for which defendant convicted).

Firearm and Other Enhancements. North Carolina’s firearms enhancement statute increases the defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum, and the facts supporting the enhancement must be alleged in the indictment or information. *See* G.S. 15A-1340.16A(d) (requiring that indictment include this allegation); *see also State v. Lucas*, 353 N.C. 568 (2001), *overruled on other grounds, State v. Allen*, 359 N.C. 425 (2005), *opinion withdrawn on other grounds*, 360 N.C. 569 (2006). This procedure also applies to the sex offender enhancement in G.S. 15A-1340.16B, the bullet-proof vest enhancement in G.S. 15A-1340.16C, and the enhancements for certain methamphetamine offenses in G.S. 15A-1340.16D (expanded by S.L. 2013-124 (H 29) to include additional circumstances, effective for offenses committed on or after Dec. 1, 2013). *See generally* JOHN RUBIN, BEN F. LOEB, JR., & JAMES C. DRENNAN, PUNISHMENTS FOR NORTH CAROLINA CRIMES AND MOTOR VEHICLE OFFENSES 8–9 & n.11 (UNC School of Government, 3d ed. 2005).

In 2008, the General Assembly added the offenses of rape and sexual offense by an adult involving a child under age 13. *See* G.S. 14-27.2A, 14-27.4A. These statutes establish a

mandatory sentence of 300 months but allow a judge, on determining “egregious aggravation,” to impose a sentence of up to life without parole. This procedure likely violates *Blakely*. See John Rubin, *2008 Legislation Affecting Criminal Law and Procedure*, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE BULLETIN No. 2008/06, at 2–4 (UNC School of Government, Nov. 2008), available at <http://sogpubs.unc.edu/electronicversions/pdfs/aojb0806.pdf>.

Legislative note: Effective for offenses committed on or after October 1, 2013, S.L. 2013-369 (H 937) amends G.S. 15A-1340.16A to apply a firearm sentence enhancement to all felonies instead of Class A through E felonies only. The length of the enhancement depends on the class of felony (72 months for Class A through E felonies instead of the current 60 months; 36 months for Class F and G felonies; and 18 months for Class H and I felonies). G.S. 15A-1340.16A(d) continues to require that the facts supporting the enhancement be alleged in the indictment or information.

Misdemeanors, including impaired driving offenses. The *Blakely* Bill applies to structured sentencing for felonies in both district and superior court. It does not apply to structured sentencing for misdemeanors, which was not affected by the *Apprendi* and *Blakely* decisions. The *Blakely* Bill also does not apply to offenses not subject to structured sentencing, such as impaired driving. However, in *State v. Speight*, 359 N.C. 602 (2005), *vacated on other grounds*, 548 U.S. 923 (2006), the court addressed the application of *Blakely* to misdemeanor impaired driving and held that for impaired driving offenses tried in superior court (either when the offense is the subject of a misdemeanor appeal or is joined with a felony for trial initially in superior court), aggravating factors other than prior convictions must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant.

The General Assembly thereafter amended G.S. 20-179 to require that aggravating factors in impaired driving cases be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. As revised, the statute also requires in superior court that the State provide notice of its intent to prove aggravating factors at least 10 days before trial. See G.S. 20-179(a1); see also Shea Denning, *What’s Blakely got to do with it? Sentencing in Impaired Driving Cases after Melendez-Diaz*, N.C. CRIM. L., UNC SCH. OF GOV’T BLOG (July 24, 2009) (discussing applicability of Confrontation Clause to evidence of aggravating factors in impaired driving cases), <http://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/?p=567>. The provisions of G.S. 20-179 also apply to other implied consent offenses. See G.S. 20-179(a) (statute applicable to impaired driving in a commercial vehicle; second or subsequent violations for operating a commercial vehicle after consuming alcohol; or second or subsequent violations for operating a school bus, school activity bus, or child care vehicle after consuming alcohol).