

8.3 Misdemeanor Appeals

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8.3 Misdemeanor Appeals

A. Scope of Jurisdiction on Appeal

Generally. On appeal of a misdemeanor conviction, the general rule is that the superior court's jurisdiction is "derivative" of the district court's jurisdiction. *See* G.S. 7A-271(b). Thus, the superior court ordinarily has jurisdiction on appeal only if: (1) the charge in superior court is the same as, or a lesser offense of, the charge alleged in the pleading in district court; *and* (2) the defendant was convicted in district court.

Requirement of same or lesser charge. On appeal of a misdemeanor conviction to superior court, the prosecution may not amend the pleadings or file a statement of charges alleging additional or different misdemeanors. *See State v. Caudill*, 68 N.C. App. 268 (1984) (superior court did not have jurisdiction to try defendant on statement of charges filed in superior court for nonsupport of illegitimate child where case arose on defendant's appeal from district court conviction for nonsupport of legitimate child; prosecution could not file statement of charges alleging new offense); *State v. Killian*, 61 N.C. App. 155 (1983) (prosecution may not file statement of charges in superior court alleging acts of nonsupport that occurred after district court trial); *State v. Clements*, 51 N.C. App. 113 (1981) (allowing amendment in superior court that did not change nature of offense).

The superior court ordinarily does not have jurisdiction over any offenses that are not strictly lesser included offenses of the conviction below. *See State v. Hardy*, 298 N.C. 191 (1979) (defendant was charged with and convicted of assault on officer in district court; on appeal, superior court did not have jurisdiction to try defendant for resisting arrest); *State v. Caldwell*, 21 N.C. App. 723 (1974) (defendant was charged with and convicted of assault on officer in district court; on appeal, superior court did not have jurisdiction to try defendant for assault by pointing gun). If the prosecution wants to charge a new misdemeanor, it must start again in district court except in the rare circumstance in which the grand jury initiates a misdemeanor prosecution by presentment in superior court. (Presentments are discussed *infra* in § 8.4B, Types of Pleadings and Related Documents.) For a discussion of potential Double Jeopardy and Due Process concerns involved in charging greater offenses in superior court following a district court proceeding, see *infra* § 8.6, Limits on Successive Prosecution.

Requirement of conviction. To confer appellate jurisdiction on the superior court, the defendant ordinarily must have been convicted of the offense charged in district court; it is not enough that a defendant was charged with the offense in district court. *See State v. Reeves*, 218 N.C. App. 570 (2012) (where defendant was charged with impaired driving and reckless driving and State took voluntary dismissal of reckless driving in district court that was not pursuant to a plea agreement, reckless driving charge was not properly before superior court on appeal for trial de novo); *State v. Guffey*, 283 N.C. 94 (1973) (district court judgment indicated that defendant was convicted of impaired driving and was silent on whether defendant was convicted of charge of driving while license revoked; superior court did not have jurisdiction over charge of driving while license revoked); *State v. Phillips*, 127 N.C. App. 391 (1997) (in district court, defendant was tried and convicted of impaired driving, but State took voluntary dismissal of speeding charge; superior court lacked jurisdiction to try speeding charge on appeal of impaired driving conviction where voluntary dismissal was not pursuant to plea agreement); *see also State v. Joyner*, 33 N.C. App. 361 (1977) (reviewing court may assume procedural regularity in district court and may examine entire record to determine whether there was conviction that would support derivative jurisdiction of superior court); *State v. Wesson*, 16 N.C. App. 683 (1972) (sufficient evidence of conviction where district court judge sentenced defendant and set superior court bond, even though judge failed to fill in the disposition “guilty” on the judgment sheet).

Exceptions. There are two exceptions to the above rules. First, if the defendant appeals a district court judgment imposed pursuant to a plea agreement, the superior court has jurisdiction over any misdemeanor that was dismissed, reduced, or modified pursuant to that agreement. *See* G.S. 15A-1431(b); G.S. 7A-271(b).

Second, on appeal of a misdemeanor conviction, the superior court has jurisdiction to accept a guilty plea (but not to try the defendant) on any “related charge.” G.S. 7A-271(a)(5). To utilize this provision, the prosecution must file an information in superior court charging the related misdemeanor, to which the defendant then enters a guilty plea. *See State v. Craig*, 21 N.C. App. 51 (1974) (on appeal of impaired driving conviction, superior court accepted plea to reckless driving; if reckless driving is “related charge” for which superior court may accept guilty plea, prosecution must file written information); G.S. 15A-922(g) (when misdemeanor is initiated in superior court, prosecution must be on information or indictment). If the defendant pleads guilty or is found guilty in superior court, the defendant also may request permission to enter a guilty plea to other misdemeanor charges pending in the same or other districts if certain procedural rules are followed. *See* G.S. 15A-1011(c); *see also infra* “Waiver by certain guilty pleas” in § 11.2D, Waiver (venue waived in this instance).

B. Required Pleadings in Superior Court

The pleading in district court may be used as the pleading in superior court on a trial de novo. *See State v. Chase*, 117 N.C. App. 686 (1995) (information or indictment not required on appeal of misdemeanor because the case was not initiated in superior court within meaning of G.S. 15A-923(a)). Although the prosecution need not obtain an

indictment or information, the warrant or other district court pleading still must meet the rules for proper pleadings (discussed *supra* in § 8.2, Misdemeanors Tried in District Court). *See also State v. Jones*, 157 N.C. App. 472 (2003) (like other pleadings, citation may not be read to jury). Thus, the defendant may move to dismiss in superior court if the warrant or other pleading is defective. *See State v. Biller*, 252 N.C. 783 (1960) (judgment arrested where superior court judge erroneously denied defendants' motion to quash fatally defective warrants) (per curiam); *State v. Madry*, 140 N.C. App. 600 (2000) (motion to dismiss for failure to charge an offense was permissible in superior court on appeal for trial de novo); *see also* G.S. 15A-952(d) (defendant may move to dismiss for a jurisdictional defect "at any time"). *But see State v. Jones*, 371 N.C. 548 (2018) (defendant has right to object to being tried on citation and require that offense be charged in new pleading; however, defendant's failure to object in district court, where he was initially tried, precluded him from objecting to being tried on citation in superior court). [In the authors' opinion, if a citation is fatally defective and fails to meet even the more relaxed requirements for citations, discussed *supra* in "Citation" in § 8.2C, Types of Misdemeanor Pleadings, the defendant still may object to the sufficiency of the citation in superior court whether or not the defendant objected in district court; in that instance the defendant is not objecting to being tried on a citation but rather objecting to the sufficiency of the allegations. Further, the defendant may be able to challenge the sufficiency of the citation as a matter of basic due process-notice requirements under the state and federal constitution, an issue not specifically argued in *Jones*.]

If the defendant objects to the sufficiency of a warrant or other criminal process in superior court, the prosecution may file a statement of charges curing the defect as long as it does not change the nature of the offense alleged in district court. *See* G.S. 15A-922(e); *State v. Martin*, 46 N.C. App. 514 (1980) (stating rule); *see also State v. Killian*, 61 N.C. App. 155 (1983) (prosecution may not file statement of charges in superior court unless defendant objects to sufficiency of pleading); *State v. Clements*, 51 N.C. App. 113 (1981) (allowing amendment of warrant in superior court that did not change nature of offense). Thus, even if the defendant files a motion to dismiss before trial commences in superior court, the prosecution may not amend the pleading or file a statement of charges changing the nature of the offense alleged.

A statutory exception allows the State to amend a warrant in superior court to change the name of the rightful owner of property if the amendment does not prejudice the defendant. *See* G.S. 15-24.1; *State v. Reeves*, 62 N.C. App. 219 (1983).

In an impaired driving case, if the defendant appeals to superior court and the State intends to use an aggravating or grossly aggravating factor, the State must provide the defendant with written notice no later than 10 days before trial. G.S. 20-179(a1)(1); *State v. Hughes*, ___ N.C. App. ___, 827 S.E.2d 318 (2019) (holding this requirement applies without regard to whether the defendant received notice of aggravating factors in district court).

C. Refiling of Misdemeanor Charges

If the prosecution takes a voluntary dismissal in superior court of a misdemeanor appealed for a trial de novo, the prosecution may not refile the charge in superior court except in limited circumstances. The prosecution may do so if: (1) the case falls within one of the categories of misdemeanors that may be filed initially in superior court under G.S. 7A-271(a) (allowing misdemeanor to be filed initially in superior court if joined with related felony or if initiated by presentment) and the statute of limitations has not run; or (2) the earlier dismissal was with leave under G.S. 15A-932 (allowing reinstatement of case after dismissal with leave based on failure to appear or deferred prosecution agreement).

D. Due Process Limits

Under the Due Process clause, if the defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor in district court and appeals for a trial de novo, the State may not initiate felony charges arising out of the same incident. Such charges are considered presumptively vindictive. *See infra* § 8.6D, Due Process.